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Since the American Revolution, mortgage foreclosures have consisted of a
public auction of the mortgaged property. Judges and state legislators at the time
believed that an auction was the best way to obtain a fair price for the land.
Though that belief soon proved to be mistaken, the sale method remains un-
changed
Before the real estate and mortgage markets crashed in 2007, only two signifi-
cant empirical studies of foreclosure sales existed, and they involved small num-
bers of foreclosures. Because the crash resulted in millions of home foreclosures, it
has provided a rich data source. As a result, economists, social scientists, and oth-
ers have produced a wealth of empirical studies on foreclosure sales and their ef-
fects both before and after the crash. Three lines of research now clearly establish
that foreclosure by public auction is seriously flawed. These studies first prove
that, in this country, even a voluntary real estate auction normally produces a
lower sale price than a private sale. A second line of studies shows that foreclosure
usually is harmful not just for the land owner, but also for the lender, neighboring
property owners, and the community. The third line of studies proves that proper-
ty sells for more when, rather than foreclosing after default, a lender allows a pri-
vate sale of the property. These studies make a very powerful case for foreclosure
reform.
Fortunately, an established and effective method for selling foreclosed land al-
ready exists-listing it for sale with a real estate agent. Currently, the lender con-
ducts a foreclosure, frequently purchases at the sale, and then lists the property for
sale with a real estate agent. This process is time consuming, expensive, and
harmful. Initially listing the property for sale with a real estate agent, rather than
first auctioning it, eliminates these problems, and the success of the process has
been proven. England, Ireland, Wales, and some Canadian provinces use this
method very effectively, and it could readily be implemented in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the American Revolution, mortgage foreclosures in the United States
have consisted of a public auction of the mortgaged property. Judges and state
legislators at the time of the founding believed that an auction was the best way
to obtain a fair price for the land. That belief, however, soon proved to be mis-
taken. From an early date, the foreclosing lender typically was the only bidder at
the auction sale, and without competition, it had no incentive to bid the land's
fair value. Despite this obvious and substantial flaw in the foreclosure process,
the auction remains by far the predominant method for selling foreclosed real
estate in this country, and the foreclosing lender purchases at more than 80 per-
cent of foreclosure sales.' Following the 2007 housing and mortgage market cri-
sis, the need for systemic reform has never been clearer.'
1. Peter Chinloy, William Hardin III & Zhonghua Wu, Foreclosure, REO, and Market
Sales in Residential Real Estate, 54 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 188, 197 (2017) (not-
ing that the foreclosing lender purchased in 85.3% of single-family home foreclo-
sures in Miami-Dade County from 2010-13); Lauren Lambie-Hanson & Timothy




Before the real estate and mortgage markets crashed in 2007, only two sig-
nificant empirical studies of foreclosure sales existed, and they involved small
numbers of foreclosures. Because the crash resulted in millions of home fore-
closure Industry 22 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 15-38, 2015),
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/fipfedpwp/15-38.htm [http://perma.cc/5JEB-
ZEZA] (noting that foreclosing lender purchased in 89% of foreclosures in Suf-
folk County, Massachusetts from 2006-10); Andreas Niedermayer, Artyom
Shneyerov & Pia Xu, Foreclosure Auctions 28 (SFB/TR 15, Discussion Paper No.
522, 2015), http://hdl.handle.net/10419/121367 [http://perma.cc/H9ER-7QED]
(noting that foreclosing lender purchased in 81% of foreclosures in Palm Beach
County, Florida from 2010-13); see also ATTOM Staff, U.S. Distressed Sale Share
Drops to Nine-Year Low in 2016, ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS (Jan. 31, 2017),
http://www .attomdata.com/news/home-prices-and-sales/2016-year-end-home-
sales-report [http://perma.cc/U8JM-E3XA] (noting that from 2000-16, foreclos-
ing lender purchased in more than 80% of foreclosures in 13 of 17 years). Howev-
er, third-party purchases have become significantly more prevalent in some mar-
kets. See ATTOM Staff, 424,800 U.S. Properties with Foreclosure Filings in First Six
Months of 2017, Down 20 Percent From Year Ago, ATTOM DATA SOLUTIONS
(July 18, 2017), http://www.attomdata.com/news/heat-maps/midyear-2017-u-s
-foreclosure-market-report[http://perma.cc/45PL-T3DQ].
2. Interestingly, public auction is the predominant foreclosure method in a wide va-
riety of countries around the world, including Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Bangladesh (Chittagong), Bolivia, Botswana, China, Colom-
bia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Gua-
temala, Honduras, Indonesia (Jakarta), Iran, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Li-
beria, Lithuania, Maldives, Malta, Micronesia, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Nicaragua, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar, Russia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri
Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia. Study on the Efficiency of the Mortgage Collat-
eral in the European Union, EUROPEAN MORTG. FED'N 57 (2007),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/EU EfficiencyMortgage Collateral
2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/R6JZ-UVQS] (Germany); JOSEPH PHILIP FORTE,
GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: REAL ESTATE (2018) (Colombia, Dominican
Republic, France, Japan, Korea, Lithuania, Russia, Sweden, Thailand, and
Ukraine); Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American
Perspective, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN LAW 35, 78-79 (2001); Klaus Koch
Saldarriaga, Olena Koltko & Maria Antonia Quesada Gdmez, Resolving In-
solvency: Measuring the Strenght of Insolvency Laws, WORLD BANK (2015),
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annua
1-Reports/English/DB15-Chapters/DB15-CaseStudy-Resolving-Insolvency.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7DTG-5DGF] (Afghanistan, Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Ar-
gentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Botswana, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatema-
la, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Maldives, Malta, Micro-
nesia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Qatar,
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, United Arab Emirates,
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zambia). Perhaps, as in Australia and other countries,
public auction is a typical real estate sale method in these countries. If public auc-
tion is not typical, the reasons for switching to private sale may not have been suf-
ficiently clear until now.
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closures, it provided a rich data source. As a result, economists, social scientists,
and others have produced a wealth of empirical studies on foreclosure sales and
their effects both before and after the crash. The research clearly demonstrates
that, in the United States, public auctions normally are less effective for selling
real estate than private sales because auctions are not the usual method for sell-
ing land in this country. The studies also show that allowing the foreclosing
lender to buy at the auction is harmful in two ways: (1) The lender usually
makes little effort to market the property before the sale in an attempt to attract
bidders; and (2) when the lender acquires the property at the sale, it is frequent-
ly a neglectful owner, which harms neighboring property owners and the com-
munity. These studies make a very powerful case for foreclosure reform. Efforts
to improve the existing auction system, as others have proposed,3 are inade-
quate because, in this country, even well run auctions usually are not as effective
as private sales. The system needs to be overhauled.
Fortunately, an established and effective method for selling foreclosed land
already exists-listing it for sale with a real estate agent. Currently, the lender
conducts a foreclosure, normally purchases at the sale, and then lists the prop-
erty for sale with a real estate agent. This process is time consuming, expensive,
and harmful. Initially listing the property for sale with a real estate agent, rather
than first auctioning it, eliminates these problems, and the success of this pro-
cess has been proven. England, Ireland, Wales, and some Canadian provinces
use this method very effectively, and it could readily be implemented in the
United States. Moreover, in another type of involuntary sale, bankruptcy, trus-
tees in this country routinely list land with a real estate agent when selling it for
the estate's benefit, rather than selling at a public auction.4
This Article proposes a solution to the foreclosure puzzle: "Foreclosure"
would consist of the lender listing the property for sale with a real estate agent;
the lender would set the asking price based on property appraisals and would
negotiate the purchase agreement with the buyer; and the property owner could
prevent the sale by repaying the lender at any time before it signs a purchase
agreement with a buyer. As a check on the lender's conduct, the owner and any
junior interest holder would have a cause of action against the mortgagee to
3. Some have advocated the use of private sales as one remedy, among others. See,
e.g., Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DuKE L.J. 1399, 1440-44 (2004); Debra Pogrund
Stark, Facing the Facts: An Empirical Study of the Fairness and Efficiency of Foreclo-
sures and a Proposal for Reform, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 639, 683 (1997); Steven
Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict Foreclo-
sure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
CORNELL L. REv. 850, 893-94 (1985).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (2012) (trustee can employ "professional persons" to carry out
trustee's duties); 11 U.S.C. § 328(a) (2012) (trustee can pay a "professional per-
son" a commission); In re McConnell, 82 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1987) (real es-
tate agents are "professionals" within meaning of Bankruptcy Code); In re Eastern




challenge deficient marketing efforts or sales price. Most importantly, neither
the lender nor anyone associated with it could purchase the property. Because
lenders normally lose money when they foreclose under the current system and
especially when they buy at the sale, this improved foreclosure method, as ex-
plained below, should reduce lending costs.
To understand why the current system is so defective, Part I of this Article
describes the evolution of American mortgage foreclosures. Part II explores the
reasons that an auction-and a foreclosure auction in particular-is an ineffec-
tive method for selling land in the United States. Part III examines the recent
empirical research that now documents the harms that foreclosure sales cause.
Part IV demonstrates that private sale can work as the usual foreclosure method
by describing the processes in Ontario and British Columbia. Finally, Part V
addresses the issues that state legislatures will confront when they decide to
switch to foreclosure by private sale.
I. How DID WE GET HERE?
In England, the earliest forerunner of the modern mortgage was called a
mort gage" (dead pledge).' The mort gage conveyed ownership of the real es-
tate to the lender subject to the borrower's right to recover it if he repaid the
loan in full on due date.6 If the borrower did not, he automatically forfeited any
further interest in the land,' though it normally was worth far more than the
outstanding debt.' To provide some relief for borrowers against this forfeiture,
the Court of Chancery began intervening to require the lender to reconvey the
land to the borrower if he paid within a reasonable time after the due date.9
However, as this relief evolved and expanded, some courts held that it was rea-
sonable to pay as much as twenty years after law day and even if the lender had
sold the property."o
This development made the mort gage far less useful as a security device.'
In response, Chancery created a tool by which lenders could terminate the bor-
rower's right." If the lender proved that the borrower defaulted on the loan,
5. Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages ofMerger, 40 VAND. L. REv. 283, 312 (1987).
6. LITTLETON'S TENURES § 332 (E. Wambaugh ed. 1903).
7. GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON
FREYERMUTH, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 6 (6th ed. 2014).
8. GEORGE E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 14 (2d ed. 1970).
9. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
10. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *158-59 n.29; 3 FRANCIS HARGRAVE &
CHARLES BUTLER, NOTES ON LORD COKE'S FIRST INSTITUTE OR COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON § 337 n.106 (1809).
1. Burkhart, supra note 5, at 317-18.
12. William M. McGovern, Jr., Forfeiture, Inequality of Bargaining Power, and the
Availability of Credit: An Historical Perspective, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 141, 150 (1979).
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Chancery would give the borrower a specified period of time to pay. If the bor-
rower failed to do so, the court would enter a foreclosure decree that terminated
the borrower's right regardless of the land's value.13
English settlers brought with them the English method of foreclosure.'4 As
in England, mortgages, by their terms, conveyed title to the mortgaged land to
the lender, and many courts treated them as conveyances." Also, as in England,
the lender's remedy for default was a judicial decree that terminated the bor-
rower's interest in the mortgaged land if he did not pay the debt within a speci-
fied time.
The colonists renamed this unsparing process "strict foreclosure," particu-
larly because colonial courts granted borrowers less time to pay than English
courts did.'" Moreover, this foreclosure process often gave lenders an especially
large windfall because land values were increasing at a greater rate than had
previously occurred anywhere.7 The high cost of strict foreclosure further
fueled popular discontent with this foreclosure method," as did the increasingly
widespread notion that a lender's only interest in mortgaged land should be a
security interest and not ownership. Consistent with this conception, borrowers
normally kept possession of the land despite the wording of a mortgage as a
conveyance.'9
For all these reasons, foreclosure by public auction began to supplant strict
foreclosure in the United States by 170520 and was by far the dominant method
by 1800.21 In some states, foreclosure by auction was statutorily authorized." In
13. Wechsler, supra note 3, at 857.
14. MYRON C. WEINSTEIN, 29 N.J. PRAC. § 1.3 Law of Mortgages, American Develop-
ments-In General 11 (2d ed. 2015); Wechsler, supra note 3, at 858.
15. H.W. Chaplin, The Story of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1890); William
H. Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory, 32 YALE L.J. 233, 240 (1923).
16. Additionally, colonial courts seldom granted time extensions, though Chancery
routinely granted borrowers multiple extensions. Sheldon Tefft, The Myth of Strict
Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REv. 575, 595 (1937) ("Foreclosure without sale was really
as it is described 'strict'; it operated summarily, harshly and oppressively.");
Wechsler, supra note 3, at 858.
17. John W. Brabner-Smith, Economic Aspects of the Deficiency Judgment, 20 VA. L.
REv. 719, 721 (1934).
18. EDGAR N. DURFEE, 1 CASES ON SECURITY 172-73 (1951).
19. Burkhart, supra note 5, at 320; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 858.
20. See, e.g., An Act for Taking Lands in Execution for Payment of Debts, ch. 152
(1705), in 1 LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 57 (Phila., John Bi-
oren 1810); 1 GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER
SECURITY DEVICES AS TO LAND 455 (1943).
21. Burkhart, supra note 5, at 326; Tefft, supra note 16, at 589; Wechsler, supra note 3,
at 858. Strict foreclosure is generally available today only in Connecticut and




other states, courts introduced it. In an 1805 decision, the Tennessee Supreme
Court explained the reason for rejecting strict foreclosure:
Consistently with the law, as laid down in all the modern books, we can
not vest the title in the [foreclosing lender]. The land, or part of it,
must be sold at public sale, and the money applied to the payment of
the debt and interest. The property may be of much greater value than
the debt and interest, and it would be most unjust to vest the whole of
it in the [lender], when the mortgage was only intended to secure a
debt; it would be equally unjust to decree the property in full satisfac-
tion, for it may be of less value than the debt and interest.23
Courts and legislatures believed that a public auction of the property was the
best way to determine its fair value4 because, with appropriate advertising
and sales procedures, third parties would bid the price to the land's value."
However, the predictions about the benefits of foreclosure by auction soon
proved to be wrong." One critical error was allowing the foreclosing lender to
bid at its foreclosure sale.7 With the right to bid at the auction, the foreclosing
lender had little incentive to spend time and money advertising the sale and
otherwise attempting to stimulate competitive bidding. Instead, the lender usu-
ally wanted to conduct the sale as quickly as possible and minimize its costs by
22. E.g., 2 PA. STATS. AT LARGE 247 (Act of 1706); 2 Kilty, Laws of Maryland, Acts of
1785, Ch. 72, § 3.
23. Hord v. James, 1 Tenn. 201 (1805); see also DURFEE, supra note 18, at 180 ("The
Age of Enlightenment (or do you call it the Age of Innocence?) saw that all the
faults of strict foreclosure could be eliminated by judicial sale of the land. If it is
worth more than the debt, the excess is saved to the mortgagor as surplus pro-
ceeds of the sale. If, on the other hand, value is less than debt, the sale accurately
measures the deficiency and does so without the expense attending trial of the is-
sue of value....").
24. Milton R. Friedman, The Enforcement of Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts in
New York, 51 YALE L.J. 382, 383 (1942).
25. Harold C. Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure Procedure-Possibilities Sug-
gested by Honeyman v. Jacobs, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 957, 963 n.33 (1940).
26. McGovern, supra note 12, at 152 ('[SIad experience has taught us that a power of
sale ... can be harder on the debtor than strict foreclosure ever was. . .. ' Thus, it
may be a mistake to regard the rise of foreclosure by sale as a major landmark in
the history of the law's protection against forfeitures."); Tefft, supra note 16, at
589-90; Vaughan, supra note 25, at 962-63; Wechsler, supra note 3, at 860.
27. R.W. Turner, An English View of Mortgage Deficiency Judgments, 21 VA. L. REv.
601, 604 (1935) ("This seems to be the main flaw in American practice, the allow-
ing of the mortgagee to bid for the property on auction sale."). Some states statu-
torily authorize lenders to buy at their own power of sale foreclosure. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 183, § 25 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3228 (2018);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.11 (2017).
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advertising the sale only to the extent legally required.' Therefore, from an ear-
ly date, the foreclosing lender frequently was the only bidder, as illustrated by a
case involving a foreclosure sale in 1784.9 As the sole bidder, the lender could
get the land for less than its fair market value and could get a deficiency judg-
ment against the borrower if the lender's bid was for less than the outstanding
debt.30
England, by contrast, took a very different approach when it allowed lend-
ers to auction mortgaged land when the borrower defaulted.? Although Chan-
cery permitted mortgage auctions as early as the seventeenth century, it very
seldom granted that remedy.32 Not until 1852 did Parliament make auction a
generally available remedy,33 and it did so for the same reason as in the United
States-to obtain a fair price for the property.3 However, no matter in what
century the auction occurred, the mortgagee could not buy because, if it did so,
the borrower's interest in the property was not eliminated.35 As a result, mort-
28. Tefft, supra note 16, at 589-90.
29. Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Cai. Cas. 1 (N.Y. 1804); see also Lucas v. Fairbanks Capital
Corp., 618 S.E.2d 488, 501 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part) ("As time went on, strict foreclosure was supplanted by foreclosure
followed by a judicial or public sale, and by the 1830s strict foreclosure had virtu-
ally vanished from the American legal landscape. Further, American courts al-
lowed the lenders to bid on the property at the judicially-ordered public auc-
tion . . .."); Wechsler, supra note 3, at 860 ("During the economic depression of
the 1820s, it became apparent that the public was only willing to pay bargain pric-
es at foreclosure sales. Absent serious competitive bidding, mortgagees usually
were the successful bidders at foreclosure sales, and they paid low prices.").
30. Lucas v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 618 S.E.2d 488, 501 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Vaughan, supra note 25, at 966 ("[T]he in-
equities of the established practice of foreclosure and sale, with a deficiency judg-
ment for the balance, were tremendously enhanced by the nation-wide economic
depression which began in 1929. Such slight market as previously existed at fore-
closure sales rapidly disappeared. The sale became a farce at which mortgagees
obtained properties, often of great intrinsic value, for mere nominal bids.");
Wechsler, supra note 3, at 860. Today, some states have enacted statutes that pro-
hibit or limit deficiency judgments. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8.3.
31. The sale was not called "foreclosure," because that term applied to the process
that is called "strict foreclosure" in the United States. Tefft, supra note 16, at 577.
32. McGovern, supra note 12, at 150.
33. Edgar Noble Durfee & Delmar W. Doddridge, Redemption from Foreclosure Sale-
The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV. 825, 827 (1925); Tefft, supra note 16,
at 580.
34. Robert M. Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price Inadequacy in
Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 846 (1980).
35. Turner, supra note 27, at 605 ("The allowing of the mortgagee to bid is foreign to




gagees actively promoted the sale and normally did not sell without having lo-
cated at least one willing and able purchaser.6
The problem in this country of allowing the foreclosing lender to purchase
at its own sale was compounded when it also was allowed to conduct the sale.37
Originally, a court conducted all mortgage foreclosures with the attendant judi-
cial oversight."8 To avoid the cost and time required for a judicial foreclosure,
lenders began including a "power of sale" clause in mortgages that empowered
the lender to sell the mortgaged land without judicial action.39 Use of the power
of sale clause was common by 1774, when the New York legislature enacted a
law that confirmed its enforceability.40 Today, thirty-five jurisdictions allow
power of sale foreclosures.41
Courts in some states have been rightly concerned about the inherent con-
flict of interest that exists when the mortgagee is both the buyer and the seller in
a power of sale foreclosure and have held such sales to be void42 or voidable.43
36. Tefft, supra note 16, at 581; see also Turner, supra note 27, at 605. Interestingly,
this process apparently worked effectively though, as in most states in this coun-
try, the lender could get a deficiency judgment if the property sold for less than
the outstanding debt. Tefft, supra note 16, at 581.
37. Tefft, supra note 16, at 591 ("[T]he sale under a power tends to be in practice a
formality for the barring of the right to redeem and in an even more intensified
degree is vulnerable to all of the objections to the American foreclosure by judicial
sale."); Washburn, supra note 34, at 847 ("The two features of the judicial sale de-
signed to achieve fairness of price-judicial supervision and public competitive
bidding-are often absent ... if the property is sold by the mortgagee under a
power of sale or by a trustee under a deed of trust. Mortgagee and trustee sales are
subject to minimal judicial supervision as to fairness of procedure or price; in
many states mortgagee and trustee sales do not require confirmation by the
court."); Donald L. Schwartz, Power of Sale Foreclosure After Fuentes, 40 U. CHI. L.
REv. 206, 213 (1972) ("The efficiency and savings that are possible through the
use of power of sale foreclosures are ... at least partially offset by the potential for
injustice that seems to be inherent in nonjudicial remedies.").
38. David M. Madway, A Mortgage Foreclosure Primer, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 146,
169 (1974).
39. Lucas v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 618 S.E.2d 488, 501 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
40. An Act for the more effectual Registry of Mortgages and for securing the Purchas-
ers of Mortgaged Estates, Laws of the Colony of New York, 1774, Ch. 39, reprinted
in 5 THE COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK 687 (Lyon 1894); Bergen v. Bennett, 1 Cai.
Cas. 1, 4 (N.Y. 1804) ("It seems that previous to the year 1775, it had been a prac-
tice to introduce into mortgages, clauses authorizing a sale by mortgagees, and
that many estates were then held under such sales."); DURFEE, supra note 18, at
173-74.
41. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 634 n.459.
42. E.g., Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153, 158 (1869); Very v. Russell, 23 A. 522, 523
(N.H. 1874) ("[T]he safer course is to discourage every appearance or suspicion
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As one court wrote, "one man cannot perform conflicting duties and inter-
ests-it being the duty of the seller to get the highest price, and the interest of
the buyer to get the property at the lowest."44 Courts in other states, however,
have held that a lender should be allowed to buy at its own foreclosure sale to
protect its security interest. These courts reason that, if the lender cannot bid at
the sale, a third party might buy the land for far less than both the property's
value and the outstanding debt amount.45
In those states in which courts held that a foreclosing lender's purchase
makes the sale void or voidable, lenders found a way to preserve their ability to
buy without being subject to challenge. In these states, lenders largely stopped
using mortgages and now instead use a deed of trust to take a security interest
in real property. Unlike a mortgage, which has two parties, the deed of trust has
three parties-the borrower ("settlor"), the lender ("beneficiary"), and a third-
party trustee. If the borrower defaults, the trustee conducts the foreclosure sale,
which enables the lender to purchase without being subject to challenge.46 As a
result of power of sale clauses and deeds of trust, today, the foreclosing lender
frequently is the only bidder at foreclosure sales throughout the country.47
of fraud, by adopting strictly the rule ... that a purchase of the mortgaged estate
by the mortgagee must, as to the mortgagor, be regarded as ipso facto fraudulent
and void.").
43. See, e.g., Williams v. Wilson, 87 So. 549 (Ala. 1920); Jackson v. Blankenship, 105
So. 684 (Ala. 1925); Blockley v. Fowler, 21 Cal. 326 (1863); Houston v. Nat'l Mut.
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 31 So. 540, 542 (Miss. 1902) (prohibition on mortgagee pur-
chase is "bottomed on the fundamental principle that no man shall be placed in a
position where there shall arise a conflict between interest and integrity"); Owens
v. Branning Mfg. Co., 84 S.E. 389 (N.C. 1915); Davis v. Doggett, 194 S.E. 288
(N.C. 1937); Mills v. Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 6 S.E.2d 549 (N.C. 1940).
44. Thornton, 43 Mo. at 153, 158 (1869).
45. E.g., WILLIAlM F. WALSH, A TREATISE ON MORTGAGES 350 (1934) ("It is ... neces-
sary that the [foreclosing mortgagee] be permitted to protect his security by bid-
ding up the property to the amount of the debt due him . . . ."); see also Galvin v.
Newton, 36 A. 3, 4 (R.I. 1896).
46. As described in the next section, the trustee's participation generally does improve
the sale process, because it is a neutral party that generally owes no fiduciary du-
ties to the borrower or lender. Terry Schaplow, Oregon's Statutory Right of Re-
demption-Any Redeeming Qualities?, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 891, 915 (noting
that the lender bought at 73.61% of sales in three Oregon counties from 1970-79).
47. Charles A. Capone, Jr., Providing Alternatives to Mortgage Foreclosure: A Report to
Congress, U.S. DEP'T HOUSING & URB. DEv. 110 (1996), www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/alt.pdf [http://perma.cc/UL2K-XMYM] ("The most common
criticism leveled against current law regards lack of competitive bidding at fore-
closure sales."); Robert K. Lifton, Real Estate in Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need
an Overhaul, 31 Bus. LAW. 1927, 1937 (1976); Rex E. Madsen, Equitable Consider-
ations of Mortgage Foreclosure and Redemption in Utah: A Need for Remedial Legis-
lation, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 327, 329 (1976); Madway, supra note 38, at 170; Nelson




When that is the case, it may bid only a nominal amount for the property and
then sue the borrower for the deficiency, unless the jurisdiction prohibits defi-
ciency judgments.4 Particularly in jurisdictions with statutory redemption, the
lender normally bids the amount it is owed, so that the debt will be repaid in
full if the owner or junior lienor redeems.49 However, it rarely bids more than
the outstanding debt amount, even when the land's value is substantially great-
er."o Therefore, properties often sell at foreclosure auctions for less than their
fair market value.5' Moreover, without third party bidders, the foreclosure sale
is a formality that wastes time and money. Because the lender acquires the
property regardless of its value in relation to the debt, the foreclosure auction
reaches the same result as strict foreclosure, which is the process that the auc-
tion was designed to cure."
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH AuCTIONS
Although real estate auctions are effective in several other countries, auc-
tions normally are not as effective as private real estate sales in the United
States. A large part of the problem is that an auction is not the usual method for
selling land in the United States.53 The only exception is forced sales, such as
48. A minority of states have anti-deficiency statutes that prohibit or limit a lender's
ability to get a deficiency judgment. Additionally, some states have one-action
rules that allow the lender to foreclose or sue on the debt but not to do both.
NELSON ET AL., supra note 7 at 704-07.
49. Statutory redemption gives the property owner and, in some states, junior lienors
a period of time after the foreclosure sale to recover the property, usually by pay-
ing the foreclosure purchaser the amount it paid at the sale. For this reason, the
foreclosing lender normally bids the full debt amount. Id. at 744-45.
50. A lender can bid up to the debt amount and credit the bid against the debt ("cred-
it bid") without paying any cash for the property. The amount of its bid is credit-
ed against the outstanding debt. Richard A. Lee, A Comparison of Arms-Length
Verses Non-Arms-Length Residential Home Sales: The Impact of Small Scale Inves-
tors, 5 J. INTL' Bus. MGMT. & RES. (2013), http://www.barton.edulpdf/faculty-
publications/lee-richard-arms-length-vs-non-arms-length-home-sales.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M8CQ-5VHJ]; Grant S. Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real
Estate Foreclosures in Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REv. 151, 152
(1982); Stark, supra note 3, at 664.
51. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 760; Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 33, at 832.
52. Schaplow, supra note 46, at 915 (noting that the lender bought at 73.61% of sales
in three Oregon counties from 1970-79). -
53. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1415 ("The prevalence of [foreclosure] auc-
tions in itself raises questions, given that auctions are not a common way of ar-
ranging arms-length market sales of real estate in the United States"); Bruce
Vanderporten, Timing of Bids at Pooled Real Estate Auctions, 5 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
EcON. 255, 255 (1992). But see Steven L. Good & Celeste M. Hammond, Real Es-
tate Auctions-Legal Concerns for an Increasingly Preferred Method of Selling Real
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foreclosures.5 4 Distressingly, though auctions are most commonly used for fore-
closures, the process is far worse than for even voluntary real estate auctions.
For example, unlike voluntary auctions, foreclosures normally are conducted by
nonprofessional auctioneers and are not widely advertised. A foreclosure bidder
normally cannot inspect the property before buying it and is in an inferior bid-
ding position to the foreclosing mortgagee. Moreover, in states with statutory
redemption, the successful bidder normally will be unable to get possession of
the property for as long as two years and may never get it if the owner redeems.
Recognizing the serious flaws in the current foreclosure process and the benefits
of private sales, the federal government encourages lenders to allow the borrow-
er to sell property, rather than to foreclose, and studies have shown that the pri-
vate sales have been more effective than foreclosure.
A. Voluntary Auctions Versus Private Sales
Simply reforming the auction process is not enough. Studies demonstrate
that private sales normally are superior to both voluntary and involuntary auc-
tions.55 In one study that compared real estate auctions with private sales, the
researchers concluded that, in the United States, "'[a] uctions are never optimal"
for the sale of real estate." This conclusion was supported by two other studies
that found that auctioned real estate sold for three to thirty-seven percent less
than privately sold property.7
Additional studies on sales in Dallas and Los Angeles provide specific ex-
amples of the sub-optimal results of public auctions." Though the price differ-
ences between auctioned and privately sold real estate were less than in the oth-
er studies, they still are consistent with those studies' conclusions. The study in
Property, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765 (2006) (discussing how real estate auc-
tions are becoming more common).
54. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 19.07 (rev. 3d ed. 2017);
Christopher J. Mayer, Assessing the Performance of Real Estate Auctions, 26 REAL
EST. EcoN. 41, 41 (1998).
55. One study found that realty sold for more at auction, but its methodology has
been criticized. See Orley Ashenfelter & David Genesove, Testing for Price Anoma-
lies in Real-Estate Auctions, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 501, 505 (1992). But see Simon Ste-
venson & James Young, An Analysis of Residential Auction Sale Prices
and Quoted Guide Prices, EUR. REAL EST. Soc'Y 1 (2005), http://www.areuea.org/
conferences/pdf/52/808.pdf [http://perma.cc/4TRK-R23B].
56. Paul D. Adams, Brian D. Kluger & Steve B. Wyatt, Integrating Auction and Search
Markets: The Slow Dutch Auction, 5 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcoN. 239, 240 (1992).
57. Mayer, supra note 54, at 42 (citing A. Wright, The Effectiveness of Various Meth-
ods of Selling Single-Family Houses: A Statistical Analysis, (1989) (unpublished
manuscript); G. Gau & D. Quan, Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Dis-
position: Negotiated Sales Versus Auction (1992) (unpublished manuscript).




Dallas compared auctions and private sales of single-family homes and of con-
dominiums that were spread over a large area during a falling real estate market
from 1985-90. The auctioned properties sold for nine to twenty-one percent
less than privately sold properties.59 The Los Angeles study involved condomin-
ium sales. Though the sales occurred in a boom market from 1981-87, the auc-
tioned properties still sold for zero to nine percent less than properties sold by
private sale.60
The most surprising and revealing study involved an auction by the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1998.61 HUD auc-
tioned 170 homes that it had acquired in southern Florida as part of a Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) insurance program for mortgage loans. Under
the program, when a lender foreclosed and bought at the sale, it could file an
insurance claim for any loss on the loan. The lender transferred title to the
property to HUD, and HUD listed the property for sale with a real estate agent
or, when it had a large number of properties in one area, hired an auctioneer."
For the auction that was the subject of the study, the auctioneer publicized
the sale by direct mail, newspaper ads, and the Internet. HUD allowed prospec-
tive bidders to inspect the properties before the sale and offered a "buyer's
awareness seminar." HUD agreed to convey the best possible title to the buy-
er-marketable title free and clear of liens and other title encumbrances, such
as mortgages and easements.6 3 Although the properties were sold "as is," HUD
provided escrow funds for repairs for some properties. It also encouraged real
estate agents to find buyers and paid a 3 percent commission if the agent's buy-
er was a successful bidder. HUD paid the closing costs for the sale, such as the
closing agent's fee and the cost of document preparation, and only required
buyers to make a 3 percent down payment if they were going to occupy the
home.64 Despite the marketing efforts, the very favorable selling terms, and a
59. Id. at 41. The study compared 234 auctions of single-family homes with 139,480
private sales and 235 condominium auctions compared with 10,423 private sales.
Id. at 53. The properties were spread over a wide area. The auctions were ordered
by a large institution, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Resolution Trust Corporation, or a private bank. Id. at 52.
6o. Id. at 53. The study compared 285 condominium auctions with 124,420 private
sales. The auctions were ordered by a condominium developer or lender that
wanted to dispose of the remaining units in a development. Id. at 52.
61. Marcus T. Allen & Judith Swisher, An Analysis of the Price Formation Process at a
HUD Auction, 20 J. REAL EST. RES. 279 (2000).
62. Id. at 281.
63. "Marketable title" is a title free of any encumbrances and not subject to any rea-
sonable challenge. ROGER BERNHARDT & ANN M. BURKHART, REAL PROPERTY IN A
NUTSHELL 293-94 (7th ed. 2016).
64. Allen & Swisher, supra note 61, at 281-83.
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strong economy, the selling prices averaged 17.45 percent less than the market
values.6 5
The experiences in several other countries demonstrate that auction can be
an effective way to sell real estate. For example, studies on sales in Australia
found that auction prices for homes in Melbourne were 8 percent higher than
for private saleS66 and 3.6 percent higher for homes in Sydney.67 In Christ-
church, New Zealand, homes in two of four study areas had auction prices that
were 5.9-9.5 percent higher than private sales, though the other two areas had
no price difference.6 1 In Dublin, Ireland 69 and Singapore,70 auction prices for
real property also are higher than private sale prices. However, important dif-
ferences exist between real estate auctions in other countries and foreclosure
auctions in the United States. Auctions are most commonly used in other coun-
tries to sell the most desirable, premium properties because there are fewer
comparable sales, which makes valuation difficult. In contrast, most foreclo-
sures in the United States do not involve higher end properties." Moreover,
overseas realty auctions generally attract many bidders, which is essential to a
successful auction. As described above, that is not the norm here and will not be
for the foreseeable future, even for sales that are not forced sales.
72 It is very tell-
65. Id. at 285. The authors also explain their method for calculating fair market value.
Id.
66. Kenneth M. Lusht, A Comparison of Prices Brought by English Auctions and Private
Negotiations, 24 REAL EST. ECON. 517 (1996).
67. Stevenson & Young, supra note 55, at 2. Contra Alex Frino, Maurice Peat & Dani-
ka Wright, The Impact of Auctions on Residential Property Prices: Australian Evi-
dence, 52 ACCT. & FIN. 815 (2012) (no price difference between auction and pri-
vate sale).
68. Mark G. Dotzour, Everard Moorhead & Daniel T. Winkler, The Impact of Auc-
tions on Residential Sale Prices in New Zealand, 16 J. REAL EST. REs. 57, 66 (1998).
Contra Frino et al., supra note 67, at 815 (finding no price difference between auc-
tion and private sale).
69. Simon Stevenson, James Young & Constantin Gurdgiev, A Comparison of the Ap-
praisal Process for Auction and Private Treaty Residential Sales, 19 J. HOUSING
ECON. 145, 153 (2010); see also Stevenson & Young, supra note 55, at 2.
70. Yuen Leng Chow, Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, Auction Versus Negotiated Sale:
Evidence from Real Estate Sales, 43 REAL EST. ECON. 432 (2015).
71. Mayer, supra note 54, at 42; Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1418;
Vanderporten, supra note 53, at 255.
72. Adams et al., supra note 56, at 251 ("If an auction attracts greater arrival of buyers
than the traditional market format, then this can serve to offset the advantage of a
[private sale] . ... In the long run, it is doubtful that auctions will permanently
increase the willingness of buyers to purchase and sell property, thus it is doubtful
that an increase in buyer arrival will be observed for auctions [in the United
States]."). One study indicated that the absence of third-party bidding is not at-
tributable to the defective foreclosure process alone. In an empirical study of fore-




ing that when lenders sell the properties that they purchased at their foreclosure
sales, only two percent are sold by auction.7 3
B. Foreclosure Auctions Versus Voluntary Auctions
More disturbingly, important differences exist between foreclosure auc-
tions and voluntary real estate auctions in the United States, and the foreclosure
auction is vastly inferior. "[I]t would be difficult to design a sale procedure less
apt to result in market prices than the usual foreclosure auction. The absence of
so many features that buyers in negotiated sales have come to expect virtually
ensures that below-market prices will prevail."74 The flaws pervade the process.
Voluntary real estate auctions are conducted by a professional auctioneer.
To protect sellers and buyers, most states in this country require that auc-
tioneers be licensed. The government conducts a character and fitness examina-
tion of license applicants and regulates them after they are licensed.5 The auc-
tioneer is the seller's agent and, as such, owes fiduciary duties to the seller. One
of those duties-diligence-obligates the auctioneer to maximize the sale
price?7 In addition to the ethical duty to maximize the price, the auctioneer has
an economic incentive-her commission usually is a percentage of the sale
price."
Stark determined that, in about 90% of the sales, the property was worth less than
the debt amount, plus the carrying and resale expenses. Stark, supra note 3, at
663-64. While the carrying and resale expenses would be relevant to a speculator
who is considering bidding at the sale, they should not affect the price paid by a
bidder who intends to occupy or lease the property. Professor Stark's tudy indi-
cated that, in fact, most third party foreclosure purchasers were not speculators
who intended to resell the property quickly. She found that successful third party
bidders re-sold the property within one year after purchasing it in only 50% of the
1993 foreclosures and 27% of the 1994 foreclosures. Id. at 666.
73. Kate Berry, Banks Face Tough Choices Unloading REO Properties, 177 (F307) AM.
BANKER 1 (Feb. 24, 2012).
74. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1423.
75. BURKE, supra note 54, at § 19.07; Good & Hammond, supra note 53, at 773, 802.
76. Good & Hammond, supra note 53, at 773.
77. BURKE, supra note 54, at § 19.07. The commission rate varies quite a bit. See, e.g.,
Annette Law, How Much of a Commission to [sic] Real Estate Auctioneers Take and
Where Do I Find a List of Reputable Companies?, TRUUA (July 25, 2014),
http://www.trulia.com/voices/Home Selling/How muchof_a_commission_to_
real estate _auctioneer-23155 [http://perma.cc/DJ8T-7D78] (noting commission
rate of 11-16%); M. Diane McCormick, Selling a Property at Auction Has Its Pros
and Cons, PENN LIVE (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/
index.ssf/2012/09/selling-a-property-atauction.html [http://perma.cc/TS7N-
7V7E] (noting commission rate of 1.5-4%).
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The auctioneer actively advertises the sale to attract bidders7' and prepares
an information package about the property for distribution to prospective bid-
ders. The package may include detailed plans of the property, a title report and
title insurance commitment, an environmental inspection report, and a de-
scription of the property's expenses.79 Bidders normally can inspect the proper-
ty, and the seller may give express warranties about the property's physical con-
dition.o The seller also may arrange financing for the buyer."
In marked contrast, in the great majority of states, the foreclosure auc-
tioneer is not a professional auctioneer, is not the borrower's agent, and owes
the borrower no fiduciary duties."2 Depending on the jurisdiction, the auction is
conducted by a public official or another third party or even by the mortgagee.3
In states in which lenders commonly use a deed of trust, rather than a mort-
gage, courts sometime state that the trustee is a fiduciary for both the borrower
and lender. However, recognizing that the borrower and lender have conflicting
goals in a foreclosure sale, courts normally do not hold the trustee to the same
fiduciary standard as other trustees. In a frequently cited passage, the California
Supreme Court described the reality of the trustee's role:
The similarities between a trustee of an express trust and a trustee un-
der a deed of trust end with the name. "Just as a panda is not a true
bear, a trustee of a deed of trust is not a true trustee." . . . [Tihe trustee
under a deed of trust does not have a true trustee's interest in, and con-
trol over, the trust property. Nor is it bound by the fiduciary duties that
characterize a true trustee.84
Also unlike voluntary auctions, foreclosure auctions receive little publicity.
Because the foreclosing lender normally is not interested in stimulating bidding
at the sale and wants to minimize its costs, it usually provides only the legally-
required notice. Depending on the state, a foreclosure advertisement may be
published in a local legal newspaper of limited circulation. The ads normally
employ technical legal terminology and generally do not provide meaningful
information concerning the property or its location." Moreover, because the
78. BURKE, supra note 54, § 19.07; Good & Hammond, supra note 53, at 771.
79. Good & Hammond, supra note 53, at 779; Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at
1421.
80. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1421-22.
81. Id. at 1421.
82. In some states, foreclosing lenders must hire a private auctioneer to conduct the
sale. Lambie-Hanson & Lambie-Hanson, supra note 1, at 1.
83. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 634.
84. Monterey S.P. P'ship v. W.L. Bangham, Inc., 777 P.2d 623, 628 (Cal. 1989).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTG.) § 8.3 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1997);




lender may be legally required to advertise the sale for a relatively short period
of time, such as three weeks, the owner normally will be unable to sell the prop-
erty before the foreclosure in an attempt to recover some of her equity in the
property.16 Astoundingly, the lender may not be legally required to notify the
owner of the sale,7 and junior interest holders often are not entitled to notice,
though the sale will terminate their interest in the property." Moreover, no "for
sale" sign is posted on the property in the great majority of states.
People who do find out about the sale and are potentially interested in bid-
ding face daunting obstacles. In a voluntary sale, a prospective purchaser exam-
ines the property and may have it professionally inspected and surveyed and an
environmental assessment conducted. In contrast, owners who are about to lose
their property to foreclosure normally do not permit property inspections,
though it would be in their best interest to do so to increase bidding at the
sale.' Gambling on the property's condition is particularly dangerous in the
foreclosure context, because a borrower experiencing financial difficulties often
does not maintain the property and sometimes succumbs to the temptation to
strip it of everything of value, including appliances and even plumbing and wir-
ing.9o
At a foreclosure auction, the foreclosure purchaser and seller do not enter
into a purchase agreement hat tailors the transaction to their specific needs and
that conditions the buyer's performance on matters such as the seller having
marketable title to the property.1 The absence of these conditions lowers the
sale price because a buyer does not want to incur the expense of due diligence,
such as a title examination, before reaching an agreement with the seller on the
price and other sale terms. Prospective foreclosure purchasers must incur these
expenses with no guarantee of being the successful bidder. Or, as is often the
case, they do not perform the due diligence and later discover, when a problem
arises, that they should have.9' The problem is compounded because the buyer
has no recourse against the seller. Unlike a voluntary sale, the seller does not
86. Zachary T. Brumfield, The "Short Cut" to the Stabilization of the Underwater
Housing Market: How the New FHFA Short Sales Guidelines Promote Economic Ef-
ficiency, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 456, 461 (2013).
87. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 580.03 (2017) (foreclosure notice must be served "upon
the person in possession of the mortgaged premises, if the same are actually occu-
pied").
88. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 634-35.
89. Id. at 1110.
go. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTG.) § 8.3 cmt. A (Am. Law Inst. 1997);
Brumfield, supra note 86, at 461-62; Yianni D. Lagos, Fixing a Broken System: Rec-
onciling State Foreclosure Law with Economic Realities, 7 TENN. J. L. & POL'Y 84, 92
(2011).
91. Lifton, supra note 47, at 1937; Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1419 n.98.
92. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1422.
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give a warranty deed with title covenants or any other warranties or representa-
tions concerning the property.93
If the prospective bidder makes it past these hurdles and decides to bid at
the foreclosure sale, the sale itself presents more hurdles. The foreclosing lender
is in a superior bidding position to any third party. The lender can bid up to the
amount it is owed without paying any cash. It offsets its bid against the amount
it is owed, in what is called a "credit bid."94 In contrast, the third-party buyer
normally has to pay cash for the property up front and may be required to do so
immediately at the sale. Because lenders normally will not finance a real estate
purchase before the buyer has a purchase agreement, the third-party buyer will
have to pay cash from its own resources, which is atypical for real estate sales.95
Perhaps the biggest barrier to third party bidding exists after the sale-
statutory redemption. More than half the states give the foreclosed owner and,
in some states, junior lienors, the right to nullify the sale by repaying the fore-
closure purchaser, typically the amount of the winning bid, plus interest.96 De-
pending on the state, the statutory redemption period lasts from six months to
two years after the sale.97 In most states, the foreclosed owner can possess the
property during that time.9' Statutory redemption is intended to give the fore-
closed owner additional time to sell the property or refinance to get the money
to redeem. It also is intended to increase the amount paid at the foreclosure
sale. The theory is that the foreclosure purchaser will realize that, if it pays too
little, the foreclosed owner or junior lienor is more likely to redeem.99 Unfortu-
nately, statutory redemption has had the opposite effect. It discourages third
party bidding and decreases the amount bidders are willing to pay.' An Eng-
lish commentator has described American statutory redemption as "absurd"
and has said that "only the worst type of parasite speculator" would bid at a
foreclosure sale that is subject to statutory redemption.o' To add insult to inju-
93. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTG.) § 8.3 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1997); Nel-
son & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1422.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. (MORTG.) § 8.3 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 1997);
NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 757-58; Washburn, supra note 34, at 849.
95. Brumfield, supra note 86, at 461; Stephen Guynn, A Market-Based Tool to Reduce
Systemic Undervaluation of Collateral in Residential Mortgage Foreclosures, 100 VA.
L. REv. 587, 595 (2014); Lifton, supra note 47, at 1936-37.
96. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 744-45.
97. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23, subd. 1 & 2 (2017) (6 months or 12 months
depending on a variety of factors); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-8-101, 66-8-102
(2016) (2 years).
98. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 744-45.
99. Brown v. Trujillo, 88 P.3d 881, 887 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
1oo. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 747; Brabner-Smith, supra note 17, at 722; Lifton,
supra note 47, at 1940; Washburn, supra note 34, at 854.




ry, it has proven to be largely ineffective. In one recent study of 1,860 single-
family home foreclosures in Alabama from 2004-12, only .59 percent of the
homes were statutorily redeemed.o2 Earlier studies found that owners redeemed
after 1.4,103 .7,104 9.78,'1 or 1006 percent of foreclosure sales.o7 The results vary
based on a variety of factors, such as market conditions, but they clearly
demonstrate that statutory redemption has generally been a failure, particularly
considering its adverse impacts on foreclosure sales.
Faced with these realities concerning our current foreclosure system, the
federal government created the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Pro-
gram that provides incentives for lenders to let defaulting borrowers sell their
home, rather than to foreclose."'s The Federal Housing Finance Agency,'9 the
102. Bruce L. Gordon & Daniel T. Winkler, Statutory Right of Redemption and the Sell-
ing Price of Foreclosed Houses, 51 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 365, 367 (2015) (statu-
tory redemption exercised 11 times in 1,860 foreclosures). The authors found that
the negative impact of statutory redemption on the foreclosure selling price was
$250 on a $90,000 foreclosure sale price. Id; see also Brabner-Smith, supra note 17,
at 722; Lifton, supra note 47, at 1940.
103. Jim Blanco & David Crumbaugh, Foreclosures, Redemptions, and Homeowners,
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 335, 351 (1975) (19 redemptions for 1,343 single-family foreclo-
sures in Cook County, Iinois in 1964).
104. Id. at 351-52 (24 redemptions by owners and 4 by judgment creditors for 3,015
single-family foreclosures in Cook County in 1974).
105. Schaplow, supra note 46, at 915 (72 redemptions for 736 sales in three Oregon
counties from 1970-79).
106. Patrick B. Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's Re-
demption Statute in Two Counties Between 1881-1980, 70 IOWA L. REv. 343, 350-51
(1985) (191 redemptions for 1,832 foreclosures).
107. Stark, supra note 3, at 674.
108. Home Foreclosure Affordable Alternative Program: Overview, MAKING
HOME AFFORDABLE (2017), http://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/
foreclosurealternatives.jsp [http://perma.cc/JX74-Q325].
1o9. See FHFA Announces New Standard Short Sale Guidelines for Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, FED. FIN. HOus. AGENCY (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.ffifa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Announces-New-Standard
-Short-Sale-Guidelines-for-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Mac.aspx [http://perma.cc/
Z24G-T8P5); Fannie Mae Standard Short Sale/HAFA II and Deed-in-Lieu of Fore-
closure Requirements, FANNIE MAE (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.fanniemae.com/
content/announcement/svcl219.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2UL-HKTL); Freddie
Mac Bulletin No. 2012-16, FREDDIE MAC (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www
.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdflblll216.pdf [http://perma.cc/HEH9
-66N8]; see also Brumfield, supra note 86; Philip J. Vacco, Surviving a Short Sale
Guidelines for a Rewarding Short Sale Experience, 27 PROB. & PROP. MAG. 40
(2013).
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Department of Housing and Urban Development,"o and the Treasury Depart-
ment" have promulgated guidelines to help accomplish that goal, and empiri-
cal studies demonstrate that these private sales by defaulted borrowers are more
effective than foreclosure auctions.
The studies focus on the sale of properties that are worth less than the debt
they secure ("short sales"). They show that, when a borrower defaults on a
mortgage loan, a short sale produces a higher sale price than a foreclosure auc-
tion,"2 which is unsurprising. In contrast to a foreclosure auction, a short-sale
property is actively marketed by a professional salesperson. Additionally, a short
sale does not present the same obstacles to prospective buyers as a foreclosure
auction. For example, the buyer can inspect the property before agreeing to buy
it, does not have to pay all cash at the time of sale, and is not subject to statutory
redemption.
When the lender buys at the foreclosure sale, the property is classified as
"real estate owned" (REO). Lenders' post-foreclosure REO sales also are less ef-
fective than short sales, which further demonstrates the benefit of avoiding a
foreclosure auction. Short sales are for higher prices than REO sales,3 because
properties that are sold in a short sale remain in better physical condition than
REO properties."4 A short sale property is less likely to be abandoned and ne-
glected than when a lender forecloses and acquires the property."' Additionally,
iio. See Letter from Carol J. Galante, Assistant Sec'y for Hous., on Updated Pre-
Foreclosure Sale (PFS) and Deed in Lieu (DIL) of Foreclosure Requirements (July
9, 2013), http://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/13-23ML.PDF [http://perma.
cc/LCT2-KGEQ]; Vacco, supra note 109.
ill. Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE (May
26, 2016), http://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/docs/hampservicer/
mhahandbook_51.pdf [http://perma.cc/5G3U-LAWJ].
112. Brumfield, supra note 86, at 457 (short sale price 10% less than fair market value;
foreclosure sale price 30% less); Nasser Daneshvary, Terrence M. Clauretie &
Ahmad Kader, Short-Term Own-Price and Spillover Effects of Distressed Residential
Properties: The Case of a Housing Crash, 33 J. REAL EST. RESEARCH 179, 186 (2011);
Calvin Zhang, A Shortage of Short Sales: Explaining the Under-Utilization of a Fore-
closure Alternative 29 (Oct. 11 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3050600
[http://perma.cc/X6Q5-JVE9] (short sale prices 8.5% greater than foreclosure sale
prices); Existing-Home Sales Improve in July, Prices Continue to Rise, NAT'L AsSO'N
OF REALTORS (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.realtor.org/news-releases/
2012/08/existing-home-sales-improve-in-july-prices-continue-to-rise [http://
perma.cc/XPC8-5HY3] (short sale price 15% less than fair market value; foreclo-
sure sale price 17% less).
113. Daneshvary et al., supra note 112, at 186, Exhibit 3.
114. Id. at 187, Exhibit 4.
115. See generally Ingrid Gould Ellen, Josiah Madar & Mary Weselcouch, The Foreclo-
sure Crisis and Community Development: Exploring REO Dynamics in Hard-Hit
Neighborhoods, 30 HOUSING STUD. 535, 538 (2015) (REO properties tend to be va-




a property's physical condition generally improves when it is listed for sale with
a real estate agent. The agent often has the property repaired and maintained
for sale purposes and monitors it throughout the listing period."'
A short sale property also remains in better condition than an REO because
short sales occur more quickly than REO sales, which also enables the lender to
recover on the debt sooner from a short sale than from a foreclosure. A study
found that, for a short sale, the time from the borrower's default until the sale is
19 months. In contrast, the foreclosure sale occurred 25 months after the bor-
rower's default. And when the lender purchases at the foreclosure sale, it will
not recover on the loan until it later resells the property, and it incurs the ex-
penses of foreclosing, owning, and reselling the property."7
Defaulting borrowers, neighboring property owners, and the community
also benefit from short sales. For borrowers, a short sale results in more of their
debt being paid, and they avoid the stigma and stress of going through a fore-
closure or of filing for bankruptcy to stay the sale. Because a short sale property
normally is in better condition than an REO, the short sale property generally
does not cause neighboring property values to decline" or decline to the same
extent as a foreclosed property.9 As a result, a short sale has less adverse effect
on the community's property tax base than a foreclosure.
As the studies described above show, private sales of real estate are superior
to voluntary and involuntary auctions. The problems with involuntary auc-
tions, such as foreclosure, are compounded by the lender's right to buy at the
sale, which stifles marketing of the property and competitive bidding. Although
foreclosure by auction was intended to generate a fair price for the foreclosed
property, it has been unsuccessful in doing so almost since its inception. The
many deficiencies in the process render that result inevitable. The need to re-
form the process is particularly acute because it inflicts losses not just on the
borrower, but also on the foreclosing lender, neighboring property owners, and
the community, as described in the next section.
pact of REO Sales on Neighborhoods and Their Residents, 53 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
ECON. 282, 283 (2016) (REO properties are less well maintained than owner-
occupied properties); Lauren Lambie-Hanson, When Does Delinquency Result in
Neglect? Mortgage Distress and Property Maintenance, 90 J. URB. ECoN. 1, 8-9
(2015) (foreclosing lenders tend to neglect properties acquired at foreclosure
sales).
116. Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at 2, 10.
117. Daneshvary et al., supra note 112, at 184 (noting the lender's expenses); see also
Capone, supra note 47, at 89 (noting that HUD saved a significant amount of
money by allowing a short sale, rather than foreclosing).
18. Daneshvary et al., supra note 112, at 203.
119. Zhang, supra note 112, at 3.
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III. ADVERSE EFFECTS OF FORECLOSURE
The crash of the real estate and mortgage markets in 2007 generated a great
deal of interest in measuring the effects of the millions of foreclosures that fol-
lowed. Before 2007, only two empirical studies were published that examined
the effectiveness of foreclosure sales, and both involved a relatively small num-
ber of sales. One study analyzed 118 sales,2o and the other analyzed 276 sales.'
Since 2007, economists, social scientists, and others have produced a wealth
of empirical studies, some of which analyze more than a million foreclosures
each."' The new research also examines a wide variety of foreclosure impacts
that had not previously been systematically studied. In light of the wide variety
of variables that affect the outcomes, such as the location of the foreclosed
properties, local market conditions, and the physical condition of the proper-
ties, the results unsurprisingly vary significantly. Generalizing from the research
also can be difficult because people involved in foreclosures behave in different
ways. For example, some lenders secure and maintain abandoned properties
that are in foreclosure, while others do not. Additionally, because this is a rela-
tively new area of research, researchers still differ in their definitions of various
terms, the ways that they 'ieasure impacts, and the variables they consider.
However, the research does clearly demonstrate that foreclosures impose
substantial monetary and nonmonetary costs on borrowers, lenders, neighbors,
and local communities. Although the market crash magnified the costs, they ex-
isted before the crash, too.2 3 The research also shows that the current method
of foreclosure is the least efficient way to address borrower default. In a report
to Congress, the Department of Housing and Urban Development described
foreclosure as "the costliest way to resolve borrower difficulties."`4 An exami-
nation of the great variety of costs generated by foreclosures demonstrates why.
A. Borrowers
The current foreclosure process imposes significant costs on borrowers, po-
120. Wechsler, supra note 3.
121. Stark, supra note 3.
122. See, e.g., John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House
Prices, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 2108 (2011) (1.05 million foreclosures); Hanqing
Zhou, Yuan Yuan, Christopher Lako, Michael Sklarz & Charles McKinney, Fore-
closure Discount: Definition and Dynamic Patterns, 43 REAL EST. ECON. 683 (2015)
(1.34 million foreclosures).
123. See, e.g., Zhou et al., supra note 122, at 688 (chart showing magnitude of the fore-
closure discount from 2000-2012).
124. Capone, supra note 47, at 3; see also Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Jr.,
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Single-Family Foreclosure Alternatives, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN.
& ECON. 105, 106 (1996); Samuel C. Waters, A View from the Trenches: The Legal




tentially including lost equity, higher taxes, and a dramatic disruption in resi-
dential and family stability. As described in Section II, the foreclosing mortga-
gee normally is the only bidder at the sale, and it normally bids only the out-
standing debt amount. Therefore, if the property is worth more than the debt,
the borrower will lose its equity in the property. When the property's value does
exceed the debt amount, the borrower can attempt to sell the property before
the foreclosure sale and use the proceeds to pay off the debt. However, borrow-
ers often do not do so. If the foreclosure is by power of sale, the process often is
too fast for the borrower to sell or may be taking place during a depressed real
estate market." Additionally, health or other personal issues may prevent the
borrower from taking action."' If the borrower does sell while the foreclosure is
pending, the sale's distressed nature will decrease the sale price, on average, by
9.78 percent from the property's normal market value.' 7
If the successful foreclosure bid is less than the outstanding debt, the bor-
rower is liable for the deficiency in most states." If, as is usual, the lender does
not sue to recover the deficiency, the borrower may have to recognize that
amount as income for federal income taxes. At the same time, the borrower is
losing the tax deductions associated with ownership."'9
If the foreclosure is on a home, the sale will be disruptive for the residents,
particularly if they include children.' The owner will incur costs searching for
and moving to a new home. The search will be particularly difficult, because a
foreclosure substantially damages the borrower's credit rating for several
years.'3' Therefore, implementing a foreclosure process that mitigates or pre-
125. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 3, at 1429.
126. Id.
127. Lee, supra note 50, at 9.
128. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8.3.
129. Before December 31, 2016, a discharged debt was not taxable income if it was se-
cured by the borrower's primary residence and if the borrower used it to buy,
build, or improve the residence or to refinance a loan for that purpose. 26 U.S.C.
§ 108(a)(1)(E)(i). A bill is pending to extend the expiration date to December 31,
2018. S. 122, 115 Cong. § 2 (2017). Capone, supra note 47, at 3; George McCar-
thy, Shannon Van Zandt & William Rohe, The Economic Benefits and Costs of
Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 30 (Research Inst. for Hous.
Am., Working Paper No. 01-02, 2001), http://www.mba.org/assets/Documents/
Research/RIHA/48517_RIHAwpO1-02.pdf [http://perma.cc/C3BD-UY6E].
130. Daniel Bahls & Katherine Hunt, Abhorring a Forfeiture: The Importance of Equita-
ble Jurisdiction in a Foreclosure Crisis, 41 STETSON L. REv. 779, 794 (2012); Alan M.
White, Foreclosure Diversion and Mediation in the States, 33 GA. ST. U. L REv. 411,
428 (2017).
131. Darryl E. Getter, N. Eric Weiss, Oscar R. Gonzales & David H. Carpenter, The
Process, Data, and Costs of Mortgage Foreclosure, in AMERICA'S FORECLOSURE
CRISIS: CAUSES AND RESPONSES 157, 166 (Russell Burns & Roy A. Foster eds.,
2012).
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vents these harms is in the best interests of not only the property owners and
their families, but also the community.32
B. Lenders
As described above, the foreclosing lender normally is the successful bidder
at the foreclosure auction. However, "successful" can be a rather misleading ad-
jective. As HUD reported to Congress: "Contrary to popularly held myths,
mortgage finance institutions lose money on nearly all foreclosures."33 HUD
estimated that foreclosing lenders suffer losses of up to 60 percent of the out-
standing loan amount, depending on variables such as the loan-to-value ratio
and the difficulty of complying with state foreclosure laws.134 The reason is that
the lender normally is unable to sell the property for enough to recoup its un-
paid loan proceeds, foreclosure costs, and carrying costs for its period of owner-
ship, such as taxes and insurance. The problem is caused in part by the "foreclo-
sure discount," which depresses the property's value, and by lenders' frequent
neglect of properties they acquire in foreclosure.
1. Foreclosure Costs
Throughout the foreclosure process, the lender is incurring costs. Interest
continues to accrue on the loan but normally is unpaid, which is lost revenue
for the lender. In many cases, the borrower has abandoned the property as a
lost cause, and the mortgagee may have to secure and maintain it and pay the
property taxeS135 and insurance premiumS13'6 even before acquiring it at the fore-
132. Prentiss Cox, Foreclosure Reform Amid Mortgage Lending Turmoil: A Public Pur-
pose Approach, 45 HOuS. L. REv. 683 (2008).
133. Capone, supra note 47, at 38-39; Foreclosure Statistics, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.
(July 13, 2007), http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein/files/foreclosure-statistics.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9DRW-LVP7]; Getter et al., supra note 131, at 166; see also Stark,
supra note 3, at 667-68 (noting that in a study of Cook County, Illinois foreclo-
sures, the mortgagee made a profit in approximately 20% of foreclosure sales in
1993 and 10% of sales in 1994). Contra Wechsler, supra note 3, at 880-81 (mort-
gagees profited on approximately half the properties they acquired at foreclosure);
Capone, supra note 47, at 39 has criticized this study's conclusions.
134. Capone, supra note 47, at 39-40.
135. If the property owner does not pay the taxes, the government has a lien on the
property for the unpaid taxes. In most states, this lien has priority over the mort-
gage. Therefore, if the government sells the land to satisfy the tax lien, the sale
eliminates the mortgage and often leaves the lender without security for the loan.
Therefore, the lender often pays the taxes even before it acquires the property. 4
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.28 [3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000).
136. The lender often will pay the insurance premiums if the borrower does not be-




closure sale. The lender must pay the foreclosure sale expenses, which can in-
clude the foreclosure notice publication cost and fees for an attorney, a process
server, and the person who conducts the sale. Although mortgage documents
normally impose liability for foreclosure costs on the borrower,3 7 lenders sel-
dom recoup them.'
The lender can incur these costs for a substantial period of time. During
normal economic conditions, a power of sale foreclosure can be completed in a
matter of weeks, but a judicial foreclosure can take up to two years.'3 9 However,
since the 2007 market crash, foreclosures have taken substantially longer. A ta-
ble that Fannie Mae publishes for its loan servicers indicates the magnitude of
the delays now associated with foreclosure.140 For each state, the table specifies
the maximum number of days that Fannie Mae will allow from the borrower's
last payment until the foreclosure sale. Depending on the state, the times for
power of sale foreclosures range from 300 days to 1,020 days. The times for ju-
dicial foreclosures range from 480 days to 1,230 days.
Although the length of the foreclosure process eventually should return to
approximately pre-2007 levels, a two-year study of foreclosures in Cook County
(Chicago), Illinois shows that the lender's costs up to and including the foreclo-
sure sale will still be substantial. The study found that the lender's costs totaled
19.61 percent of the outstanding debt amount in 1993 and 18.43 percent in
1994. The largest costs were for accrued interest and to secure the property.4'
2. Ownership Expenses
When the lender buys at the foreclosure sale, it becomes responsible for the
costs of ownership, including property taxes, insurance premiums, any home-
owner's association assessments, utilities, and maintenance costs. The lender
also may pay a management company to monitor and maintain the property.
Obviously, the lender's total ownership expense depends on how long the
property remains REO. The REO period varies substantially depending on the
property's location and local market conditions. For example, before the mar-
ket crash, the median REO period ranged from 175-250 days in Chicago and
from 277-308 days in Atlanta. After the crash, the median REO period ranged
no longer be worth as much as the secured debt. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at
155-56.
137. Vaughan, supra note 25, at 977-78.
138. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 3, at 877-78.
139. Capone, supra note 47, at 3.
140. Foreclosure Time Frames and Compensatory Fee Allowable Delays Exhibit, FANNIE
MAE (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.fanniemae.com/content/guide-exhibit/
foreclosure-timeframes-compensatory-fees-allowable-delays.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ 6AAS-9F5D].
141. Stark, supra note 3, at 669-70.
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from 178-608 days in Atlanta, 359-1,113 days in New York City, and 175-450
days in Miami-Dade County.14' A study of foreclosures in the Raleigh-Cary,
North Carolina metropolitan area found that properties remained REO an av-
erage of 203 days.'43 However, a significant number of properties remain REO
for more than three years.'44 These figures certainly refute the commonly of-
fered justification for foreclosure by auction-that it is a quick remedy for the
lender.
In addition to incurring the costs of foreclosing and owning the property,
the lender incurs additional expenses to sell it. Typically, the lender retains the
services of a real estate agent and must pay the agent a real estate commission.
In addition to the other selling costs, the lender may have to pay for property
repair and rehabilitation to get the property market-ready."'
4
The total costs can be substantial. The United States Department of Veter-
ans Affairs estimates that the lender's post-foreclosure holding and selling costs
total 15.95 percent of the property's value.146 In 2002, Freddie Mac cited a study
that estimated the average costs for the foreclosure sale, unpaid interest, and
property disposition to be $58,759 per loan.47 These costs, on top of the
amount the borrower owed at foreclosure, can exceed the lender's return from
selling the property, especially because the lender normally cannot sell it for its
full pre-foreclosure value, as described in the next section.
3. Foreclosure Discount
After incurring the costs of foreclosure and property ownership, the lender
normally experiences another loss when it sells the REO property due to the
"foreclosure discount." The discount is the difference between the sale price for
an REO property and the fair market value for a comparable property. The re-
searchers do not yet agree on the factors that should be considered when calcu-
lating the foreclosure discount.1" But, despite their differences, they virtually all
142. Ellen et al., supra note 115, at 540-41, 552.
143. Lee, supra note 50, at 9.
144. Ellen et al., supra note 115, at 552.
145. Campbell et al., supra note 122, at 2121; Lee, supra note 50, at 6; Stark, supra note
3, at 675.
146. VA Net Value Factor - Effective - 12/23/2015, U.S. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
(Dec. 2, 2015), http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/servicers-valeri.asp
[http://perma.cc/4958-LH8L].
147. Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 5 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No.
04-03, 2004), http://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/fmwp-0403
_servicing_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/LET8-WHS5].
148. See, e.g., Esther Cho, Ten States with the Biggest Foreclosure Discounts: RealtyTrac,




agree that REOs sell for less than comparable properties.149
The magnitude of the foreclosure discount varies among the studies. The
estimates range from 7.7 to 50 percent.50 This difference is partly a function of
the different measures that researchers employ and the different real estate
markets they are studying. However, recent research is uncovering numerous
other variables that affect the discount amount, such as the number of REOs in
the area, market conditions, whether the state has statutory redemption, and
housing prices in the area."'
The most consistently identified cause of foreclosure discount is the REO
property's deteriorated condition. As described above, when borrowers experi-
ence financial difficulties, they may be unable to continue maintaining the
property."' After losing the property to foreclosure, they may strip it or other-
wise damage it."' When the lender acquires the property, it normally continues
to deteriorate because lenders and their loan servicers frequently do not proper-
ly maintain REO properties.154 Although the lender has an economic incentive
to preserve the property's value for resale, competing economic considerations
2012/ten-states-with-biggest-foreclosure-discounts-realtytrac-20 12- 9-03
[http://perma.cc/9Z33-G725] (combining foreclosure sales and REC sales); Lee,
supra note 50, at 11 (using median foreclosure sale price versus county-wide me-
dian sale price); Albert J. Sumell, The Determinants of Foreclosed Property Values:
Evidence from Inner-City Cleveland, 18 J. Hous. REs. 45, 51 (2009) (measuring
REO sale price versus property's estimated market value); Zhou et al., supra note
122, at 683 (using REO sale price versus property's estimated market value).
149. In a relatively early study, the researchers determined that "no statistically signifi-
cant foreclosure discount exists," but a Financial Economist and Policy Adviser in
the Atlanta Federal Reserve Research Department has characterized this finding as
"unusual relative to the other studies." W. Scott Frame, Estimating the Effect of
Mortgage Foreclosures on Nearby Property Values: A Critical Review of the Litera-
ture, 95 ECON. REv. 1, 4 (2010).
150. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 73, at 25-30; Campbell et al., supra note 122, at 2129
(27%); Cho, supra note 148 (10 states with foreclosure discount greater than
40%); Stan Humphries, What's the Real Discount on a Foreclosure?, ZILLOW
(Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.zillow.com/research/whats-the-real-discount-on-a
-foreclosure-3229/ [http://perma.cc/C84G-GYEZ] (7.7%); Lee, supra note 50, at 2
(24.13%); U.S. Real Estate Statistics & Foreclosure Trends Summary, REALTYTRAC
(Aug. 28, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/statsandtrends [http://perma.cc/ULF3
-3YEE] (44%); Sumell, supra note 148, at 51 (50%); Zhou et al., supra note 122,
at 687 (15% average from 2000-2012).
151. See Campbell et al., supra note 122, at 2110; Sumell, supra note 148, at 57-58;
Zhou et al., supra note 122, at 717.
152. Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at 2.
153. Sumell, supra note 148, at 46.
154. Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, supra note 115, at 283; Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at
8-9; cf Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1,
42-43 (2011).
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may outweigh that incentive. If the property is not generating income and the
borrower is not making payments, the lender or servicer cannot recoup its ex-
penditures for maintenance and repairs.55 The lender also may determine that
the work will not sufficiently enhance the property's value for the lender to re-
cover the cost when it sells the property.
The other reason that REO properties tend to deteriorate is that lenders
frequently fail to adequately monitor them."' This neglect can lead to nonstruc-
tural problems, such as overgrown lawns and unshoveled sidewalks, and to
much larger problems, such as a burst pipe that floods the basement. Untended
properties also attract trespassers, such as squatters, drug dealers, and vandals,
who can take over the property and seriously damage it.' As a result of lenders'
failures to monitor and maintain their REO properties, they are the subject of
3.8 times more citizen complaints than properties that are not in foreclosure.'
Three additional aspects of an REO sale also contribute to the foreclosure
discount. REO properties normally are vacant.'1 9 A study has established that a
vacant home, whether REO or non-REO, sells for about 6 percent less than an
occupied home.6 o The same study showed that vacant homes take longer to sell
than occupied homes.16' However, the lender normally wants to sell quickly to
limit the cost and responsibility of ownership. With this knowledge, a prospec-
tive buyer may make a below-market offer, which the lender may accept.'
62 Fi-
155. Lee, supra note 50, at 6.
156. Ellen et al., supra note 115, at 538; Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at 2.
157. WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: The MUNICIPAL
IMPACT OF TODAY'S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 14 (2005),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/238785386_CollateralDamage_The
MunicipalImpact ofToday'sMortgageForeclosureBoom [http://perma.cc/
84KF-BHZN]; Ryan M. Goodstein & Yan Y. Lee, Do Foreclosures Increase Crime?
24 (FDIC Ctr. For Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2010/wp2010/2010-05.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BJR7-C6RY]; Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at 8.
158. Lambie-Hanson, supra note 115, at 10; see also Jackelyn Hwang, Racialized Recov-
ery: Post-Foreclosure Pathways in Distressed Neighborhoods in Boston 24 (Joint Ctr.
for Hous. Studies, Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. 15-1, 2015),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edulffles/wl5-1_hwang.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5HBB-LUU9]. One large-scale purchaser of REO homes esti-
mated that it would have to spend $5,000-$20,000 on each home to prepare it for
rental. Lee, supra note 50, at 12.
159. Ellen et al., supra note 115, at 537-38.
16o. Chien-Chih Peng & Lary B. Cowart, Do Vacant Houses Sell for Less? Evidence from
the Lexington Housing Market, 72 APPRAISAL J. 234, 240 (2004).
161. Id.
162. See Campbell et al., supra note 122, at 2121; Stephan Whitaker & Thomas J. Fitz-
patrick IV, The Impact of Vacant, Tax-Delinquent, and Foreclosed Property on Sales




nally, the property is tainted by the stigma of foreclosure. HUD has estimated
that REO sale prices are "at least" five percent lower because of that stigma
alone.163
Though a foreclosing lender sometimes reaps a windfall16 4 foreclosure by
auction normally is, on average, not beneficial for it. It incurs costs in the fore-
closure process that it normally does not recover from the borrower. If the
lender purchases at the auction, which it frequently does, it bears the responsi-
bilities and costs of ownership. To recover its investment in the property, the
lender must sell it and incur the costs of selling. However, it often will not re-
cover its entire investment from the sale, particularly because the price will be
reduced by the foreclosure discount. Moreover, foreclosure by auction is slow
when measured by how long it takes the lender to recoup at least some of its
money by selling the property.
Clearly, foreclosure by auction is not an effective or efficient remedy for
lenders or for borrowers. However, they did contract for that remedy in the
mortgage. On the other hand, the neighboring property owners and the local
government did not, and they also suffer negative consequences from the pro-
cess, as described in the next sections.
C. Neighbors
Recent research clearly establishes that foreclosure adversely affects not on-
ly the foreclosed property's value, but also nearby property values. The studies
are uniform in finding a negative price effect, though the results concerning the
magnitude of the price effect vary. Most studies find that neighboring proper-
ties suffer a 1-2 percent price decline for each foreclosed home in the area.
Some studies have found significantly greater adverse effects."5 For example, a
study of more than 1 million foreclosures in Massachusetts found that, on aver-
age, the fair market value of each home within a quarter mile of a foreclosed
No. 11-23R, 2012), http://www.clevelandfed.org/en/newsroom%20and%
20events/publications/working/o20papers/2011%20working%20papers-/-/medi
a/9dbd4474499a4e3bbcl523271930bace.ashx [http://perma.cc/JJ2V-UXGH].
163. Capone, supra note 47, at 38; see also Zhou et al., supra note 122, at 685.
164. Stark, supra note 3, at 668.
165. See, e.g., Daneshvary et al., supra note 112, at 203 (1.06% within 0.1 miles and 0.4-
0.7% within 0.1-0.5 miles); Kristopher Gerardi, Eric Rosenblatt, Paul S. Willen &
Vincent Yao, Foreclosure Externalities: New Evidence, 87 J. URB. ECON. 42, 44
(2015) (2.6% decrease if nearby REO is in poor condition; 1.5% if in average con-
dition; small positive impact if in good condition); John P. Harding, Eric Rosen-
blatt & Vincent W. Yao, The Contagion Effect of Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URB.
EcoN. 164, 165 (2008) (1% decrease for each nearby foreclosed property); Whita-
ker & Fitzpatrick, supra note 162, at 19 (1.4% value decrease if a vacant or delin-
quent property is within 500 feet). But see Helen Mason, No One Saw It Coming-
Again: Systemic Risk and State Foreclosure Proceedings: Why a National Uniform
Foreclosure Law Is Necessary, 67 U. MIAMI L. REv. 41, 55-57 (2012).
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home decreased by 1.1 percent but that the average value of homes within one-
tenth of a mile decreased by 7.2 percent.66 The aggregate loss in value for
neighboring properties was as much as $477,000 for each foreclosure.'67 Alt-
hough the total loss calculation was based on foreclosures that occurred in
2008, the percentage loss calculations for individual properties were based on
foreclosures from 1987-2009, so the price decreases it found were not simply a
function of the 2007 market crash.
Instead, the same factors that depress the price of REO properties also de-
press the prices of neighboring properties. The typically poor or non-existent
maintenance of the REO property and its vacancy have spillover effects,'" and
those effects normally increase as the property's condition deteriorates from the
time of the borrower's default until the lender's REO sale.'69 Although the spill-
over usually diminished after the REO sale, at least one study has found that the
negative spillover continues after the lender's sale if the purchaser is an investor,
rather than a person who will occupy the home.17 0 Investors buy homes to con-
vert them to rental properties. Because rental properties normally are not as
well maintained as owner-occupied homes, the property's deterioration contin-
ues and the spillover effect increases. This problem is particularly significant be-
cause investors today may purchase as many as half of all REO properties.7'
Researchers uggest other factors that may contribute to the spillover effect.
For example, an appraiser or real estate agent may include a nearby foreclosed
home as a comparable in determining the value of a home that has not been
foreclosed. Another potential factor is that foreclosures increase the supply of
properties for sale, thereby reducing prices.'" Regardless of the reason, neigh-
bors of a foreclosed property are losing value in their property, temporarily or
permanently.
Beyond economic loss, research shows that a vacant and run-down fore-
closed property diminishes the neighborhood's quality of life, satisfaction, and
sense of community.'1 This occurs in part because of the increase in crime as-
sociated with foreclosed properties, particularly when the property is REO and
166. Campbell et al., supra note 122, at 2126-27.
167. Id. at 2128.
168. Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, supra note 115, at 283; Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, supra note
162, at 3-4, 31; White, supra note 130, at 428.
169. Harding et al., supra note 165, at 164.
170. Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, supra note 115, at 300.
171. Id. at 283.
172. Frame, supra note 149, at 5; Whitaker & Fitzpatrick, supra note 162, at 3-4.
173. See, e.g., Christie D. Batson & Shannon M. Monnat, Distress in the Desert: Neigh-
borhood Disorder, Resident Satisfaction, and Quality of Life During the Las Vegas
Foreclosure Crisis, 51 URB. AFF. REv. 205 (2015); Misun Hur, Yanmei Li & Kathryn
Terzano, Breaking the Chain: Understanding the Association Between Foreclosure




vacant.17 4 "Police officials interviewed for th[e] study... cited the damage to
quality of life from empty, foreclosed properties, including gang activity, drug
dealing, prostitution, arson, rape, and murder."175 One study found a 19 percent
increase in violent crimes within 250 feet of foreclosed vacant properties com-
pared to 250 to 353 feet away. 6
The fallout from the 2007 market crash has vividly demonstrated the devas-
tating effects that foreclosures can have on neighborhoods. However, even in
normal economic times, foreclosed properties-and REO properties in particu-
lar-negatively affect surrounding properties and their residents. Diminishing
these impacts by eliminating REOs will benefit not only those who are most di-
rectly affected, but also their communities, as described in the next section.
D. Communities
Although commentators have noted that foreclosures impose direct costs
on local governments and a loss of property tax revenue,'" no empirical re-
search supported these statements until recently. The first study that attempted
to quantify the costs that local governments incur in connection with a foreclo-
sure was a 2005 study on foreclosures in Chicago."'8 The authors identified 26
different costs that the city could bear in connection with a foreclosure, from
document filing fees to demolition expenses. The authors then estimated the
city's costs for seven different foreclosure scenarios, ranging from a sale in
which the property is never vacant and all property taxes are paid to a situation
in which the owner and lender both abandon the property and it later catches
fire and has to be demolished. The estimated costs range from $27 for the for-
mer case to $34,199 for the latter case.179
174. Ingrid Gould Ellen, Johanna Lacoe & Claudia Ayanna Sharygin, Do Foreclosures
Cause Crime?, 74 J. URB. EcON. 59, 59 (2013); Goodstein & Lee, supra note 157, at
3; Hwang, supra note 158, at 26.
175. APGAR & DUDA, supra note 157, at 6.
176. Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, Vacancy and Crime, 87 J. URB. EcON. 72, 84
(2015).
177. See, e.g., Ellen et al., supra note 115, at 538; Getter et al., supra note 131, at 166;
McCarthy et al., supra note 129, at 31; White, supra note 130, at 428.
178. William C. Apgar, Mark Duda & Rochelle Nawrocki Gorey, The Municipal Cost of
Foreclosures: A Chicago Case Study, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUNDATION
(2005), http://www.issuelab.org/resources/1772/1772.pdf [http://perma.cc/BT5U-
JUDC].
179. Id. at 24-26 (explaining the seven scenarios); id. at 39-40 (estimating costs of each
scenario).
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The first empirical study analyzed the impact of foreclosures on the proper-
ty tax base.8"o It examined foreclosures in Georgia from 2006-2011. The re-
searchers found that the median number of home foreclosures during that pe-
riod increased by 1 percent. That increase caused a 3 percent decrease in the
property tax base, which had a significant negative impact on property tax rev-
enues.' This loss is particularly problematic because local governments derive
most of their revenue from property taxes.
A 2015 empirical study is the first to comprehensively analyze foreclosures'
impacts on both property tax revenues and local government expenditures. It
examined the foreclosures in 55 of Florida's 67 counties from 1997-2011.183
With respect to property tax revenue, each REO decreased the county tax base
by $782,123.184 Three factors caused the decrease: (1) lenders sold REOs at a
discount, (2) the negative spillover effect on neighboring properties, and (3)
REOs increased the supply of homes for sale, which depressed prices."' This de-
crease in the tax base diminished the tax revenue by $5,068 for each foreclo-
sure.'6 The aggregate county tax base loss was $208,147,860, which reduced the
tax base by 1.65 percent. 8 7
With respect to expenditures, the study found that each foreclosure in-
creased the median county's costs by $3,981 for activities such as maintaining
neglected REOs.'" The study also determined the amount by which each REO
decreased government spending for the following public services and the total
spending reduction for each of these services."9
18o. James Alm, Robert D. Buschman & David L. Sjoquist, Foreclosures and Local Gov-
ernment Revenues from the Property Tax: The Case of Georgia School Districts, 46
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 1 (2014).
181. Id. at 8 (noting 3 percent decrease); id. at 10 (calling this decrease a significant im-
pact).
182. Id. at 1.
183. Keith Ihlanfeldt & Tom Mayock, Foreclosures and Local Government Budgets, 53
REGIONAL SCI. & URB. EcoN. 135, 136 (2015). The study did not include small ru-
ral counties for which the necessary data were unavailable. Id. at 138.
184. Id. at 145.
185. Id. at 137; Email from Keith Ihlanfeldt, DeVoe Moore Eminent Scholar and Pro-
fessor of Economics, Florida State University, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis Brad-
bury Kellar Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (January 4,
2017) (on file with author).
186. Ihlanfeldt & Mayock, supra note 183, at 146.
187. Id. at 145.
188. Id. at 146.
189. Id. at 145 tbls 7 & 8. "Court Administration" includes the costs for the court, state
attorney, public defender, and juries. "Culture/Recreation" includes the costs for
cultural and recreational facilities. "General Government" includes local govern-




Reduction/REO Total Reduction % Decrease
Court
rtin $251 $67,206 6.6%Administration
Culture/Recreation $1,959 $523,989 8.7%.
General
Goenen $2,472 $627,345 1.2%Government
Human Services $1,113 $297,588 5.0%
Public Safety $3,384 $904,788 1.2%
At the median county REO inventory level, the combination of increased
foreclosure-related costs and lost revenue caused a deficit of $2,416,083, which
was 1 percent of the median county's total budget.'o Although the increased
number of REOs after the 2008 market crash magnified the losses, the number
of REOs had been increasing significantly even before the crash. From 1997-
2007, the number of REOs doubled. They more than doubled again from 2007-
2011.191 Therefore, without significant change in the foreclosure process, fore-
closures and REOs will likely continue to be an ongoing problem for govern-
ments.
Although generalizing from these three studies can be dangerous, especially
because two of them include foreclosures that occurred after the market crash,
the studies show significant public costs and diminished public goods for both
pre- and post-crash foreclosures. When coupled with the losses to borrowers,
lenders, and neighbors, the existing foreclosure system is extremely difficult to
justify. Foreclosure by auction is over 200 years old in this country, and it has
not functioned properly for most of that time. It is time to switch to a comner-
cially reasonable means of selling land. By listing the property for sale with a re-
al estate agent, the losses currently caused by foreclosure auctions and REOs can
be substantially mitigated and possibly eliminated.
The prospect of changing foreclosure to private sale often also raises con-
cerns about matters such as setting the asking and sale prices, negotiating the
purchase agreement, and dealing with an uncooperative seller. However, several
legal systems successfully employ private sale to foreclose, as described in the
next section.
vices" includes treatment of sick, injured, and handicapped individuals and com-
munity welfare. "Public Safety" includes law enforcement and fire control costs.
Id. at 137 tbl 1.
190. Id. at 146.
191. Id. at 141.
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IV. FORECLOSURES IN ONTARIO AND BRITISH COLUMBIA
England,'9 Ireland,93 Wales,94 and the Canadian provinces of Alberta,'95
British Columbia,96 Ontario,'97 and Quebec'9' have efficiently and effectively
implemented foreclosure by private sale. These systems differ in many respects,
but all have successfully addressed the types of process issues raised in the pre-
ceding paragraph. This section discusses the Ontario and British Columbia pro-
cedures because foreclosure by private sale is used in virtually every foreclosure
in those provinces. Their comparison also is instructive because they differ in
some significant ways, such as judicial involvement and the lender's right to
buy. But the details about these procedures are less important than the larger
point that foreclosure by private sale is eminently workable.
A. Ontario
The Ontario system works effectively and is widely accepted. It also demon-
strates that foreclosure by private sale can be implemented in the United States
because the Ontario power of sale and private sale procedures are very similar
to those in this country. The Ontario process emphasizes speed and cost sav-
ings. Although a mortgagee has three available remedies when a mortgagor de-
faults,99 it virtually always chooses "power of sale," which allows it to sell the
192. European Mortgage Federation, Study on the Efficiency of the Mortgage Collateral
in the European Union 167 (2007), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bclbe/EU
EfficiencyMortgageCollateral_2007.pdf [http://perma.cc25UU-DQ5C].
193. Id. at 108.
194. Id. at 167.
195. Alberta Rules of Court, A.R. 124/2010 § 9.32(2) (Can.); AM. COLL. OF MORTG.
ATT'Ys, INC., MORTGAGE LAW SUMMARY Canada-2 (2015); Dave Fitzpatrick,
Foreclosure Process in Alberta, ALBERTA HOME LENDING (Nov. 24, 2017),
http://albertalending.ca/foreclosure-process/ [http://perma.cc/ZX8Q-947V].
196. See infra Part V.B.
197. See infra Part V.A.
198. Civil Code of Qu6bec, L.R.Q. c. C-1991, §§ 2784 (sale by creditor) & 2791 (sale by
court) (Can.); AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-53 &
54; E-mail from Antoine Leduc, Partner, BCF, LLP, in Montreal, Qu6bec, to Ann
M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School (Aug. 29, 2016, 9:15 CDT) (on file with author).
199. Whether the mortgaged property is residential or commercial, the mortgagee's
remedies are (1) "foreclosure," in which a court transfers title to the mortgagee
without a sale; (2) judicial sale, which is a judicially-supervised sale; or (3) "power
of sale," in which the mortgagee sells the property without judicial supervision.
However, the mortgagee may use a judicial sale if the property is "unusual, com-
plex, or difficult to sell" or if an improvident sale claim is likely. AM. COLL. OF




property without judicial supervision. This remedy is substantially faster and
less expensive than the other two remedies."oo Additionally, mortgagees can sue
for a deficiency after a power of sale but not after an alternative remedy, fore-
closure, which is the equivalent of strict foreclosure in the United States. As an
indication that power of sale is also the government's preferred method, a
mortgagee that fails to include a power of sale clause in the mortgage has a stat-
utory power of sale.20 However, mortgagees rarely need to rely on the statutory
power, because mortgages virtually always include the clause.
A mortgagee can initiate a power of sale after the loan has been in default
for only 15 days.2 The mortgagee gives a Notice of Power of Sale to the mort-
gagor and other interested parties, such as subsequent (junior) encumbranc-
ers.2 o3 If the mortgagor pays the debt within 35 days after the mortgagee gave
the notice (the "redemption period"), the mortgagee cannot proceed with the
sale.20 4 Alternatively, the mortgagor has a statutory right to stop the sale process
by paying just the amount of the default (the "arrears") and the costs that the
mortgagee incurred in connection with the default.2 '
To raise the funds to redeem or pay the arrears, the mortgagor may attempt
to sell the property or to refinance. The mortgagee cannot interfere with the
mortgagor's attempts by taking any action to sell the property during the re-
demption period.2o' For example, the mortgagee cannot advertise the property
for sale or enter into a purchase agreement to avoid interfering with the mort-
200. E-mail from Andrew Bury, QC, Partner, Gowling WLG, in Vancouver, British
Columbia, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Keller Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School (Aug. 17, 2017, 0:25 CDT) [hereinafter E-mail from
Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017)] (on file with author).
201. Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, § 24 (Can.).
202. Id. at § 32 (Can.). The loan must be in default for at least three months for a
statutory power of sale. Id. at § 24. Of course, the mortgagee can elect to wait
longer, or the mortgage document may require more time. See FALCONBRIDGE ON
MORTGAGES 35-8 (Walter M. Traub ed., 2003); JUDITH M. WOLF, A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO MORTGAGE REMEDIES IN ONTARIO 82 (2d ed. 2013).
203. Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, § 31 (Can.). The redemption period for a
statutory power of sale is 45 days. Id. at § 26(1).
204. Id. at § 32 (Can.). Interestingly, subsequent encumbrancers do not have the right
to redeem. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 64.04(6).
205. Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, § 22(1) (Can.).
206. Id. at § 42(1); FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-22. Increasing the debt during
the redemption period with new selling expenses also complicates redemption be-
cause the mortgagor will not know the exact redemption amount. E-mail from
Abraham Costin, Partner, McCarthy Tetrault, LLP, in Toronto, Ontario, to Ann.
M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School (Sep. 18, 2017, 9:30 CDT) (on file with author).
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gagor's sales efforts.2 o7 The mortgagee cannot even have the property appraised
because a potential lender could hear about it and refuse to make a loan to the
mortgagor or do so only on more onerous terms.208 The other purpose for this
restriction on the mortgagee is to prevent additional expenses being added to
the debt,
If the mortgagor neither redeems nor pays the arrears during the redemp-
tion period, the mortgagee can start the sale process, though the mortgagor can
stop it by tendering the debt or the arrears before the mortgagee signs a pur-
chase agreement with a buyer.2 09 Based on the power of sale, the mortgagee can
sell the property by private sale, public auction, or tender.2"0 However, mortga-
gees "rarely use" public auction or tender. They virtually always list the proper-
ty for sale with a real estate agent."
The sale process is facilitated by the mortgagee's right to possess the prop-
erty when the mortgagor defaults.212 If the mortgagor does not voluntarily leave
the property, the mortgagee has a judicial action, and the sheriff will enforce the
judicial writ of possession by eviction.2 13 Although the mortgagee's assertion of
its right to possess terminates any leases that are junior to the mortgage, senior
leases are not extinguished. Instead, the mortgagee can collect rents from the
senior tenants, which it uses to pay the property's operating expenses and the
outstanding debt. The mortgagee also cannot terminate residential tenancies,
2 14
207. PETER D. QuINN & DANNY C. GRANDILLI, REAL ESTATE PRACTICE IN ONTARIO 416
(8th ed. 2016).
208. WOLF, supra note 202, at 77.
209. QuINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 405;.FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 19-
20.
210. For tender, the mortgagee and a real estate broker identify potentially interested
-buyers and request that they tender an expression of interest in buying the prop-
erty and at what price. The lender may then negotiate with one or more of those
who respond. QUINN & GRANDLLI, supra note 207, at 418-19; E-mail from Silvana
M. D'Alimonte, Partner, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP, Toronto, Ontario, to Ann
M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:24 CDT) (on file with author).
211. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-40; Telephone In-
terview with Abraham Costin, Partner, McCarthy Tetrault, LLP, in Toronto, On-
tario (Aug. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Abraham Costin].
212. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 406; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 22-
3 ("Notwithstanding that the mortgagee is entitled by law to possession [when the
mortgagor executes the mortgage], it is usual in Ontario to insert in a mortgage a
proviso that the mortgagor until default shall have quiet possession of the
lands. .. .").
213. WOLF, supra note 202, at 116, 141.




though it has a statutory right to show an occupied single-family home to pro-
spective purchasers."'
As in the United States, the mortgagee can elect to have a receiver manage
the property."' Also as in the United States, if the mortgagee instead takes pos-
session, it has "extensive and sometimes onerous obligations with regard to the
maintenance and operation of the property."17 In an important difference from
the United States, the mortgagee may have to use its own funds to pay the
property expenses if the property does not generate enough income to cover
them, though the mortgagee can add those advances to the outstanding debt."'
The American approach seems preferable, because it reduces the cost of foreclo-
sure and limits the mortgagee's potential loss on the defaulted loan.
In addition to potential duties with respect to the property, the mortgagee
has duties to those who are affected by the power of sale. If the property has res-
idential tenants, the mortgagee becomes responsible for all the landlord's duties
under the Residential Tenancies Act,' 9 including returning the tenants' deposits
though the mortgagee did not receive them from the mortgagor. The mortgagee
in possession also has a strict duty to account to the mortgagor and junior en-
cumbrances for all income and expenses.2 20
The mortgagee also bears a heavy burden to the mortgagor and subsequent
encumbrancers to get the best possible price for the property." The mortga-
gee's best practice is to list the property with an agent who is experienced in
selling properties of the same type in the area where the property is located.m
Once the property is listed, the agent shows it like any other property. 3 In fact,
the mortgagee should direct the agent not to disclose that the sale is pursuant to
215. Id. at § 55.
216. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. Arr'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-41.
217. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 407; see also Silven Properties Ltd. v. Royal
Bank of Scotland, EWCA [2003] Civ. 1409, 5 13.
218. QuINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 407; NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 218
("[In the United States,] the mortgagee is not bound to contribute funds out-of-
pocket and thus need not expend more than the rents and profits received from
the premises.").
219. R.S.O. 2006, c. 17 (Can.).
220. QuINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 407.
221. FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-24 (The courts "have imposed a high duty
on the selling mortgagee to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the best possi-
ble price is obtained, taking into account the fact that it is a forced sale and, fur-
ther, that market conditions may not be favorable.").
222. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 418; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-
29.
223. WOLF, supra note 202, at 149.
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a power of sale to avoid depressing any offers. 4 In addition to acting "bona
fides" in conducting the sale and considering the mortgagor's interests, the On-
tario Supreme Court has said that the mortgagee often also must take the fol-
lowing actions:
* Advertise the property in ways that reach a large number of prospective
buyers;
* Obtain a "proper" appraisal;
* Post "For Sale" signs on the property;
* List the property on a multiple listing service; and
* Market the property for a reasonable amount of time.25
The mortgagee typically sets the asking price by getting two appraisals."
The appraisals must be based on the usual standards. If the appraisals are not
close, Abraham Costin, a leading Toronto real estate lawyer, recommends get-
ting a third appraisal both to set a fair asking price and to protect against any
challenge to the sale.'
Although the mortgagee does have a duty to obtain the best possible price,
some limitations exist. For example, the mortgagee does not have to try to in-
crease the sale price by painting the property or by undertaking other pre-
marketing activities.'29 If the mortgagee does incur expenses to enhance the
property, it can add the costs to the outstanding debt only if they are reasonably
balanced by the resulting benefits.23o Additionally, the mortgagee can choose to
sell even if the real estate market is depressed, rather than wait until the market
improves in an attempt to sell the property for a higher price.2 31 Finally, the
mortgagee can accept a lower price in exchange for a faster sale, rather than
holding out for a higher price while interest continues to accrue on the loan.32
224. See QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 419; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at
35-28.
225. Broos v. Robinson, [1984], O.J. No. 236, 556 If 4 & 5 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.); AM.
COLL. OF MORTG. ATr'ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-40.
226. WOLF, supra note 202, at 105.
227. FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-28; WOLF, supra note 202, at 105.
228. Telephone Interview with Abraham Costin, supra note 211.
229. Silven Properties Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Scotland, EWCA [2003] Civ. 1409,! 16.
230. Id. at 5 17. For this reason, Mr. Costin advises his commercial lender clients not to
make tenant improvements, because a court may not view them as an allowable
expense. Telephone Interview with Abraham Costin, supra note 211.
231. Silven Properties Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Scotland, EWCA [2003] Civ. 1409, 1 15;
FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-24.




The sale must be at arm's length. Therefore, unlike in the United States, the
mortgagee or any closely related person or entity cannot buy the property.2 33 If
the mortgagee violates this restriction and purchases, it is merely a mortgagee in
possession, rather than the owner. On the other hand, subsequent encumbranc-
ers can buy the property.34
When a buyer is identified, the mortgagee and buyer negotiate the purchase
agreement.235 It must include the same types of terms as for a voluntary sale,236
though the mortgagee usually makes no representations, including about the
property.37 At the closing, the mortgagee signs the deed and gives the buyer
written declarations about (1) the mortgagor's default, (2) service, with the
original or notarial copy of the post office receipt of registration, if any, at-
tached, and (3) the sale's compliance with the statutory requirements. These
declarations are recorded with the deed and constitute conclusive evidence of
compliance.238 Additionally, if the mortgagee gave notice in accordance with the
statutory requirements, the buyer's title cannot be defeated by other errors in
the sale,2 39 unless the buyer had actual or constructive notice of a defect.240
As in the United States, the title transfer eliminates the mortgage that was
the basis for the sale, as well as the owner's and subsequent encumbrancers' in-
terests in the property.4' Therefore, the mortgagee must account for the sale
price and expenses.' The mortgagee uses the sale proceeds to first pay the sale
expenses, then loan interest and costs, and then the remaining principal bal-
ance.243 If any proceeds remain, the mortgagee gets a statement from the subse-
quent encumbrancers about how much they are owed and pays them in order
of seniority. If any proceeds still remain, the mortgagee pays it to the mortgag-
or."4 Conversely, if the sale proceeds are insufficient to repay the mortgagee, it
has an action for the difference between the sale price and debt amount (the
233. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 420; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-
26.
234. FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-33 & -34.
235. Kevin Marron, Powers of Sale: Good Deals, Bad Karma, Hard Work for the Lawyer,
33 CANADIAN LAw. 19, 19 (2009).
236. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 418.
237. Marron, supra note 235.
238. Mortgages Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.40, § 35 (Can.).
239. Id. at § 36.
240. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 421; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-
37.
241. WOLF, supra note 202, at 150.
242. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 404.
243. WOLF, supra note 202, at 152.
244. QUINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 404.
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"deficiency") against anyone who is liable for the debt, including any guaran-
tors.
The owner, subsequent encumbrancers, and guarantors can assert a claim
that the sale price is less than the property's fair market value (an "improvident
sale").2 45 That claim can be made in an action against the mortgagee or as a de-
fense to an action for a deficiency.26 If the claim is successful, the mortgagee is
liable for the difference between the sale price and the price the mortgagee
should have obtained. The mortgagee also may lose its right to sue for a defi-
ciency.'7 To avoid an action for improvident sale, two lawyers who have writ-
ten a treatise on Ontario real estate law counsel:
Throughout the conduct of a sale under power of sale, the mortgagees
must always act defensively with an eye to the potential attack by others
demanding after completion that they make up an alleged deficiency.
There is very little opportunity to correct mistakes made in the conduct
of the proceedings, with the result that mortgagees may find themselves
vulnerable to an attack at a later date, at which point they are unable to
do much to protect themselves. It is essential that mortgagees and their
solicitors conduct the sale with the utmost care in order to minimize
the possibility of liability at a later date.7
They also state that "the results of a mismanaged sale proceeding can be
devastating."'9 Interestingly, absent fraud, courts generally do not grant in-
junctive relief to stop a sale or to invalidate it. They reason that the person seek-
ing the injunction will not suffer irreparable damage if the sale occurs because
the action for damages is available.5
B. British Columbia
Although mortgages in British Columbia often include a power of sale
clause, as in Ontario and the United States, mortgagees cannot sell property
without judicial oversight unless the mortgagor and all other affected parties
agree.25' Instead, mortgagees normally use foreclosure by sale," which is a hy-
245. WOLF, supra note 202, at 154.
246. According to Mr. Costin, a claim of improvident sale most frequently is asserted
when a mortgagee sues guarantors for a deficiency. Telephone Interview with
Abraham Costin, supra note 211.
247. QuINN & GRANDILLI, supra note 207, at 404; FALCONBRIDGE, supra note 202, at 35-
24.
248. QuINN & GRANDLLI, supra note 207, at 405.
249. Id. at 410.
250. Broos v. Robinson, [1984], O.J. 236, 8 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.); FALCONBRIDGE, supra
note 202, at 35-25, 35-27.




brid of private sale and public auction. It provides greater protections for the
mortgagor than the Ontario system, but, as a result, it is slower and somewhat
more expensive.253
When a mortgagor defaults, the mortgagee begins the foreclosure by sale
with a demand letter to the mortgagor.54 If the mortgagor does not comply
with the letter's terms, the lender files a petition, an affidavit in support of the
petition, and a certificate of pending litigation with the Supreme Court2 55 and
registers the certificate in the local land title office to alert potential buyers, new
lenders, tenants, and others about the foreclosure."' The mortgagee must join
everyone whose interest in the property will be terminated, as well as anyone
against whom the mortgagee wants a personal judgment for the debt.5 7 The re-
spondents have 21 days to defend by filing a Response to Petition.5a At the end
of that time, the court holds a hearing and, if the mortgagee prevails, issues an
Order Nisi. The Order allows the mortgagee to proceed with the foreclosure
and grants judgment against the respondents who are personally liable for the
debt.25 9
The court usually allows the borrower to reinstate the mortgage by bringing
it current and paying the lender's collection expenses.2"0 The court also normal-
252. Id. at Canada-9; Andrew Bury, Mortgage Collections in British Columbia, GOWLING
WLG 2-3 (Aug. 2017), http://gowlingwlg.com/getattachment/People/Andrew-
Bury/MortgageCollections_-_brochure.pdf.xml?lang=en-GB [http://perma.cc/
Q3YC-LQMJ].
253. The mortgagee also can petition the court to transfer the property to it without a
sale ("foreclosure," which term also refers to the entire mortgage enforcement
process), which is equivalent to strict foreclosure in the United States. However,
mortgagees rarely use this remedy because a deficiency judgment is unavailable
and because the mortgagee must pay the property transfer tax. Am. COLL. OF
MORTG. Arr'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-9; Bury, supra note 252, at 2-3.
254. Am. COLL. OF MORTG. Arr'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-8.
255. Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, § 21-7(1) (Can.). The Supreme
Court is the provincial superior trial court. Supreme Court, THE COURTS OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA (2018), http://www.courts.gov.bc.ca/supremecourt/
[http://perma.cc/2D27-4YQG].
256. Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, § 21-7(4) (Can.); AM. COLL. OF
MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-8; Bury, supra note 252, at 4.
257. Supreme Court Civil Rules,, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, § 21-7(2) (Can.); 40 THE
CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST, MORTGAGES, TITLE 104 (WESTERN) § 268 (4th
ed. 2016); Allan McEachern, On Foreclosure Practice, 41 THE ADVOCATE 583, 584
(1983).
258. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. Arr'YS, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-8.
259. Id.; Bury, supra note 252, at 4-5.
260. Moore v. North Pacific Fish Ltd., 23 B.C.J. 2407 [1980]; CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC
DIGEST, supra note 257, at § 409; McEachern, supra note 257, at 594. Judicial ap-
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ly provides a redemption period in the Order that gives the mortgagor addi-
tional time to pay the debt before the mortgagee can sell the property."' If the
mortgagor does not redeem during the redemption period, the mortgagee ap-
plies to the court for an Order for Conduct of Sale."' Interestingly, the court
normally will not grant an Order for Conduct of Sale to the mortgagee during
the redemption period,263 though it may grant an Order to a subsequent
chargeholder (junior lienor) to enable it to try to sell the property before the
mortgagee's sale terminates the junior interest.264
When the mortgagee gets the Order for Conduct of Sale, it almost always
lists the property for sale with a real estate agent, whether the property is resi-
dential or commercial."' Because the mortgagee must act in a commercially
reasonable manner in setting the listing price, it normally gets a current ap-
praisal and a recent opinion of value from an experienced real estate agent who
proval normally is unnecessary because mortgagees usually voluntarily allow a
mortgagor to reinstate the loan. Bury, supra note 252, at 5.
261. Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, § 21-7(5)(b) (Can.). For residen-
tial properties, the redemption period normally is six months. However, the court
may grant an extension if the property's fair market value exceeds the debt
amount and if the borrower is actively marketing the property or seeking refi-
nancing. Conversely, the court may not allow any redemption period or may
grant a shorter one if the mortgagor has damaged the property or abandoned it or
if the property's value is less than the debt. Because commercial properties nor-
mally are more unique than a home and often take longer to market, the court de-
termines the redemption period based on the situation and often grants more
than six months. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-9;
Bury, supra note 252, at 6-7; British Columbia Branch, Foreclosure, THE CANADIAN
BAR Ass'N (April 2015), http://www.cbabc.org/For-the-Public/Dial-A-Law/
Scripts/Housing/415 [http://perma.cc/FYB7-WX7Y].
262. CANADLAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST, supra note 257, at § 255. In the very unusual
case in which the mortgagee requests the court to transfer title directly to it, the
mortgagee applies for an Order Absolute, rather than an Order for Conduct of
Sale. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-8; Bury, supra
note 252, at 7.
263. McEachern, supra note 257, at 588-89; see also HSBC Bank Canada v. A.S. Bains
Developments Ltd., 2015 B.C.S.C. 2194 [2016]; CIBC Mortgage Corp. v. Gomez,
71 A.C.W.S. (3d) 375 [19971.
264. Reliable Mortgages Investment Corp. v. Longiye, 2015 B.C.S.C. 903 [2015]; Can-
lan Investment Corp. v. Gibbons, 42 B.C.L.R. 199 [1983]; Bury, supra note 252, at
6, 8; McEachern, supra note 257, at 589. The subsequent chargeholder can sell on-
ly if the sale price is enough to pay the foreclosing mortgagee in full. E-mail from
Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200.
265. E-mail from Andrew Bury, QC, Partner, Gowling WLG, in Vancouver, British
Columbia, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School (Aug. 24, 2016, 21:17 CDT) [hereinafter E-mail
from Andrew Bury (Aug. 24, 2016)](on file with author); see also McEachern, su-




works in the area where the property is located. The mortgagee often initially
lists the property for somewhat more than the higher of the two value estimates,
which helps to establish in any subsequent challenge that the listing price was
commercially reasonable."'
Unlike in Ontario, mortgagors normally retain the right to possess the
property, and they generally cooperate with the sales efforts.17 A distinguished
British Columbia foreclosure lawyer, Andrew Bury, estimates that more than 95
percent of owners recognize that, if they are unable to pay the mortgage, the
property must be sold, and they cooperate with the mortgagee's realtor and
others involved in the sale process."' Additionally, residential tenants are legally
obligated to allow showings of their residence."9 Mr. Bury said that allowing
mortgagors and their tenants to retain possession during the listing period
"works remarkably well." For the very small minority of mortgagors who seri-
ously interfere with the sale efforts, a mortgagee can get a court order that ena-
bles it to get possession or even title to the property.2 70
When the listing agent receives a written offer to buy, the mortgagee's law-
yer negotiates the purchase agreement with the prospective buyer.'" The mort-
gagee must be cautious in drafting the agreement. If it does not properly dis-
claim liability, the mortgagee can be treated as the vendor for all purposes. For
example, in Wiebe v. Rook,271 the court held that both the mortgagee and the
mortgagor were liable to the buyer for damage to the property and for fixtures
that the mortgagor removed. Although the mortgagor was the sole wrongdoer,
266. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200.
267. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 24, 2016), supra note 265.
268. E-mail from Andrew Bury, QC, Partner, Gowling WLG, in Vancouver, British
Columbia, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School (Aug. 25, 2016, 11:00 CDT) [hereinafter E-mail
from Andrew Bury (Aug. 25, 2016)] (on file with author).
269. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-10.
270. The court has considerable discretion in determining whether to take possession
from the owner. Law and Equity Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, Chapter 253, § 15 ("The
court may, before or after judgment in a proceeding' . . by a mortgagee, for the
foreclosure of the equity of redemption in mortgaged property ... direct a sale of
the property or land on the terms the court considers just."); Supreme Court Civil
Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, § 13-5(1) (2009) (Can.) ("If in a proceeding it appears
necessary or expedient that property be sold, the court may order the sale and
may order a person in possession of the property ... [to] deliver up the posses-
sion ... to the purchaser or person designated by the court.").
271. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200; Ian Watt, House and
Condo Foreclosure Process in Vancouver, British Columbia, MON CHATEAu (2018),
http://www.monchateau.ca/ForBuyers.php [http://perma.cc/2QMF-JX6H].
272. [1985] 67 B.C.L.R. 257 (B.C.C.C.); see also No. 269 Sail View Ventures v. Angell,
[1993] B.C.W.L.D. 2141 3.
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the court held that the mortgagee was liable to the buyer because it was the ven-
dor in the purchase agreement!
After the parties sign the agreement, the buyer normally has a relatively
short period of time to perform due diligence. If the buyer wishes to proceed
after conducting the due diligence, all the contract conditions, except one, are
eliminated from the agreement. The condition that remains is getting the
court's approval for the sale, because that approval is legally required.2 73 There-
fore, after the buyer eliminates the other conditions, the mortgagee applies to
the court for a hearing and an order that approves the sale.74 The court will not
approve the sale unless it finds that the property was properly marketed and
that the sale price is the fair market value.?75
To address the court's concerns about the sale, the mortgagee usually pro-
vides a relatively recent appraisal and the listing agent's written description of
the sales efforts, including matters such as the advertising, the number of show-
ings and open houses, offers and counter-offers, and any issues with the proper-
ty.2'7 The owner and subsequent chargeholders can oppose the mortgagee's ap-
plication by challenging the sales efforts and the sale price.2 77 The challengers
commonly offer a recent appraisal that includes a higher fair market value and
another realtor's written opinion that criticizes the listing agent's marketing ef-
forts.78 Interestingly, purchase by the mortgagee is not a cause for objection as
long as the price is fair. 79
The other very important check on the mortgagee's sale price is the bidding
that often occurs during the hearing. One to four weeks before the hearing, the
listing agent notifies other realtors and potentially interested buyers about the
hearing and publicly discloses the sale price.2o During the hearing, the presid-
ing Master asks if anyone in the courtroom, including the contract purchaser,
273. Watt, supra note 271; see also No. 269 Sail View Ventures v. Angell, [1993]
B.C.W.L.D. 2141, at ¶ 7.
274. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-9.
275. CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST, supra note 257, at § 333; E-mail from Andrew
Bury (Aug. 24, 2016), supra note 265; see also No. 269 Sail View Ventures v. An-
gell, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 2141, at f 10.
276. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200.
277. Bury, supra note 252, at 7.
278. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200.
279. Bank of Montreal v. Butler, [1990] B.C.W.L.D. 869. However, the mortgagee
normally is permitted to purchase only in exceptional circumstances, such as
when no third party has made an offer to purchase. "[T]he reason for reluctance
to allow a trustee/mortgagee to purchase has been the basic concern in all court-
ordered mortgaged sales, namely, that it may result in an inadequate price being
obtained." Id. at f 29.




wants to make an offer, and often they do." Bids must be condition free." The
listing agent puts the competing bids and each bidder's certified deposit check
or bank draft in a sealed envelope.283 The Master reviews the bids and normally
awards the property to the highest bidder.4 Therefore, if the contract buyer is
willing to pay more for the property, he must attend the hearing to bid." If no
one bids and if the Master is satisfied that the contract price is the fair market
value, she approves the sale to the contract buyer.26 However, if the Master is
dissatisfied with the price, she can decline to approve the contract, and the
property will be re-listed for sale.17
If people want to buy the property, why not contact the listing agent, rather
than waiting to bid at the hearing? They frequently do contact the agent. How-
ever, sophisticated buyers, particularly those who are buying a commercial
property, prefer to wait for the competitive advantage they gain by learning the
contract price before bidding, which is a problem created by a dual system of
private sales and public auctions."
When the Master approves the sale, she issues a "Vesting Order" that vests
title to the property in the buyer, free of any charges that were subsequent o the
foreclosed mortgage.9 The buyer does not receive a deed but, instead, registers
the Vesting Order in the land title office, which creates a new title in the buyer's
name.29 o The Master specifies the date on which the buyer can take possession
of the property.
As in Ontario, this process is well accepted and works effectively.9' It is
slower and somewhat more expensive, which mortgagees dislike. However, the
bidding frequently produces a higher-and often substantially higher-price.
The price increase offsets the additional expense, reduces any potential defi-
281. Am. COLL. OF MORTG. ATT'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-9; McEachern, su-
pra note 257, at 591.
282. McEachern, supra note 257, at 591.
283. CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIC DIGEST, supra note 257, at § 368.
284. Id; see also No. 269 Sail View Ventures v. Angell, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 2141 ¶! 4 &
5.
285. Watt, supra note 271.
286. AM. COLL. OF MORTG. Arr'Ys, INC., supra note 195, at Canada-9.
287. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 17, 2017), supra note 200.
288. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 25, 2016), supra note 268.
289. British Columbia Branch, supra note 261.
290. McEachern, supra note 257, at 591; E-mail from Andrew Bury, QC, Partner,
Gowling WLG, in Vancouver, British Columbia, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis
Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School (Oct. 14,
2016, 10:49 CDT) (on file with author).
291. E-mail from Andrew Bury (Aug. 25, 2016), supra note 268.
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ciency, and may provide a surplus for distribution to the subsequent charge-
holders and the owner.2 92
V. REFORM CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES*
As described in the earlier sections of this Article, foreclosure by auction is
time consuming and expensive. It imposes costs not just on the borrower and
foreclosing lender, but also on neighboring property owners and the communi-
ty. To eliminate the foreclosure auction and implement foreclosure by private
sale in the United States, state legislatures must consider several issues.
First, is the lender the appropriate person to conduct the sale? The experiences
in both Ontario and British Columbia clearly demonstrate that the lender is ful-
ly capable of hiring a suitable real estate agent, setting the asking price, negotiat-
ing the sale price and purchase agreement, transferring title to the buyer, and
accounting to the owner and junior interest holders for the sale proceeds and
expenses. However, to help eliminate collusion and self-dealing, the lender and
anyone closely associated with it must be disqualified from purchasing the
property. As a further check on the lender's actions, it should be personally lia-
ble if the owner or any other interested party successfully challenges the sales
price, as in Ontario.
Second, should the borrower have the right to possession during the sales peri-
od? This question raises both jurisprudential and practical issues. The Ontario
approach, which gives the lender possession, presents a jurisprudential issue in
many states. In the so-called title theory and intermediate theory states, the is-
sue would not exist because they characterize a mortgage as giving a mortgagee
the right to take possession of the mortgaged property when the mortgagor de-
faults. 93 However, the majority of states-the lien theory states-reject he no-
tion that a mortgage gives the lender any right to possess the property. In these
states, a mortgage merely conveys a lien to the lender, which it can foreclose
upon default.94
. In contrast, the British Columbia approach, in which the borrower retains
possession, presents a practical issue. Would American owners be as coopera-
tive with the lender's efforts to sell their property as owners in British Colum-
bia? Presumably, some owners who have stopped paying their mortgage will
want to remain on the property, rent-free, for as long as possible and, therefore,
292. E-mail from Andrew Bury, QC, Partner, Gowling WLG, in Vancouver, British
Columbia, to Ann M. Burkhart, Curtis Bradbury Kellar Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Minnesota Law School (Sept. 24, 2017, 20:10 CDT) (on file with author).
293. In its earliest form, title theory characterized a mortgage as immediately giving the
mortgagee title and the right to possess the mortgaged land. However, title theory
states today generally prohibit the lender from taking possession until the bor-
rower defaults. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (MORTG.) § 4.1 cmt. a (Am.
Law Inst. 1997).




will interfere with the sales efforts. However, other owners facing foreclosure
have cooperated with the lender by voluntarily selling their property.2 95
Because defaulting owners do behave differently, the better rule is to allow
them to stay in possession unless they impede the sales efforts. Leaving owners
in possession is consistent with their expectations and with lenders' normal
practices because, ven in title and intermediate theory states, lenders normally
do not take possession based on the right that the mortgage confers. To deal
with owners who interfere with the sales efforts, states can statutorily authorize
a lender to petition a court for possession, as in British Columbia. This ap-
proach is consistent not only with the title and intermediate theories, but also
with lien theory, because, even in lien theory states, a lender can have a receiver
appointed to take possession.9' Moreover, in some states, the lender can be the
receiver.97
Although courts differ on the circumstances that justify appointment of a
receiver, many require the lender to prove that the owner is committing waste
or engaging in other wrongdoing and that the lender's security is thereby im-
paired because the property's value has declined to less than the outstanding
debt.'9 However, this standard is inappropriate in a system of foreclosure by
private sale. Instead, the standard should be one that focuses on whether the
owner is interfering with the sales efforts. In that type of system, obstructive
owners are not just impairing the lender's security, they are attempting to de-
prive the lender of its entire security. Therefore, they should lose their right to
possess.
Third, should the borrower continue to have a post-foreclosure statutory right
of redemption? No, because it has proven to be a failed attempt to help owners.
Though it does give the owner an additional period of rent-free possession, it
depresses foreclosure sale prices and, if the owner does not expect to redeem,
contributes to property deterioration because the borrower is unlikely to invest
in maintenance. Moreover, the right is seldom exercised.99
. A better approach is to provide enough time before the foreclosure sale for
the owner to have a realistic chance to sell the property or to refinance. Illinois
follows this approach, and it has proven to be far more effective than post-
foreclosure statutory redemption. For mortgages on residential property, the
statutory redemption period is either seven months after the court gets jurisdic-
tion of the foreclosure action or three months after it enters judgment, which-
295. Zhang, supra note 112.
296. NELSON ET AL., supra note 7, at 223-29.
297. Id. at 222-23.
298. Id. at 223-29. Others states have a less stringent standard. For example, the Uni-
form Commercial Real Estate Receivership Act, which three states have enacted,
provides that equitable grounds, including the owners' inability to pay their debts,
can be sufficient for appointment of a receiver. UNIF. COM. REAL EST.
RECEIVERSHIP ACT § 6(a)(3) & cmt. 1 (Unif. Law Comm'n 2015).
299. See supra text and accompanying notes 102-07.
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ever is later. For other mortgages, the period is six months after the court gets
jurisdiction or three months after it enters judgment, whichever is later.30 The
sale cannot occur until the redemption period expires.
Before Illinois provided these pre-foreclosure statutory redemption rights,
it provided only post-foreclosure statutory redemption. To test the effectiveness
of each approach, an empirical study compared the number of redemptions
under both. The study showed that when owners and junior lenders had only a
post-foreclosure redemption right, they seldom exercised it. In contrast, owners
statutorily redeemed in "a very large percentage of cases" when they could do so
before the foreclosure sale.30' With pre-foreclosure statutory redemption, not
only were redeeming owners more likely to keep their property, but they also
could avoid the additional expense of a foreclosure sale.
Finally, should every foreclosure include judicial involvement? A hearing
should be available but not mandatory. When no one disputes the sale process
or price, a hearing unnecessarily increases the time and expense of foreclosure.
Moreover, a mandatory hearing should be unnecessary as a check on the fore-
closing lender's sales efforts if it is personally liable for selling the property for
less than its fair market value. Although British Columbia's post-sale hearing
often results in a higher price, the price may be higher because the prospect of
the hearing, like the prospect of statutory redemption, depresses the amount
that a contract buyer is willing to offer. Buyers who enter into a purchase
agreement with a lender that is exercising its power of sale must incur the costs
of negotiating the agreement and of due diligence, such as title examination and
property inspection, with no guarantee that the property will be theirs. Moreo-
ver, disclosure of the contract price facilitates savvy bidders' ability to get the
property from the buyers.
CONcLusION
For many decades, legal commentators and others have criticized the inef-
fectiveness of foreclosure by public auction. The voluminous empirical research
that the market crash generated now clearly establishes that the process is not
only ineffective, it also is often harmful to lenders, borrowers, neighbors, and
the communities where foreclosures occur. Research also shows that in the
United States, even voluntary real estate auctions often produce lower sales
prices than private sales and that, when a borrower defaults, private short sales
are preferable to foreclosure sales. This research all points to eliminating fore-
closure auctions and to selling properties by private sale instead. Other coun-
tries' experiences and this country's experience with real estate sales in bank-
ruptcy prove that this reform is feasible and effective. It is long past due in the
United States.
300. 75 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15-1603(b)(1) & (2), 5/15-1507(b); In re Carter, 312 B.R.
356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2004).




For many years, states have resisted substantially reforming their foreclo-
sure laws even though the process is seriously flawed. Hopefully, the recent em-
pirical studies will provide the necessary impetus, because they clearly demon-
strate the widespread hardships that our current foreclosure systems can cause.
Converting to foreclosure by private sale is a relatively easy reform because it
takes advantage of an existing sale system, and it would be an effective reform,
as demonstrated by the experiences of other countries.
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